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EXCLUDING RELIGION
NELSON TEBBEt
This Article considers whether the government may single out religious ac-
tors and entities for exclusion from its support programs. The problem of selec-
tive exclusion has recently sparked interest in lower courts and in informal dis-
cussions among scholars, but the literature has not kept pace. Excluding
Religion argues that the government generally ought to be able to select reli-
gious actors and entities for omission from support without offending the Con-
stitution. At the same time, the Article carefully circumscribes that power by de-
lineating several limits. It concludes by drawing out some implications for the
question of whether and how a constitutional democracy ought to be able to in-
fluence private choices concerning matters of conscience.
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INTRODUCTION
May the government single out religious actors for exclusion from
its support programs? For example, could a state establish a voucher
program that funded all public and private schools other than reli-
gious ones?1 Or would it be permissible for a board of education to
display only secular holiday symbols in schools? 2 Could a town open
its library facilities for use by all community groups except those that
conduct worship services? 3 Such questions have recently sparked in-
terest in court opinions and in informal discussions among scholars.
This Article attempts to answer them as a matter of constitutional law.
Questions like these may be framing a new paradigm in the law of
religious freedom. Two other problems have traditionally occupied
courts and commentators. First has been the issue of whether and
how the state can regulate religious practices despite the Free Exercise
Clause. Virtually everyone has agreed that the government cannot sin-
gle out particular religious groups for special regulation except in ex-
traordinary circumstances. The dispute has been whether or not it
can enforce general laws that do not purposefully discriminate on the
basis of religion but that nevertheless have the effect of burdening ob-
servance.
A second problem has concerned whether the government can
support religious groups in keeping with antiestablishment principles.
Familiar disagreements have involved state aid to religious schools,
displays of holiday symbols on town property, and inclusion of the
words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. Together these two
I See, e.g., Eulitt ex rel. Eulitt v. Me. Dep't of Educ., 386 F.3d 344, 356 (lst Cir. 2004).
2 See, e.g., Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2006).
3 See, e.g., Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891 (9th
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 143 (2007).
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paradigms continue to describe many cases at the intersection of relig-
ion and government.
Now, however, a different issue has moved into the foreground:
whether the government may select religious entities for exclusion
from its support programs. One way of thinking about this matter-
the problem of excluding religion-is that it shifts attention from the
question of whether the government may fund religion to whether it
4must do so once it elects to support comparable secular actvities.
Previously, officials were required to exclude sectarian activities and
institutions from subsidies in order to comply with federal antiestab-
lishment rules.5 Today, lawmakers might decide to support only secu-
lar practices as a matter of policy.6 Whether they are permitted to do
so is an incipient constitutional issue.
Why has this third problem become important only recently?
Doubtless the causes are multiple, but one important factor must be
the contemporary turnabout in antiestablishment law. During the last
decade or so, the Supreme Court has shifted course and allowed new
4 Government "support," as that term is used in this Article, may take many forms,
including cash aid, use of public property, construction contracts, and even state em-
ployment. The paradigmatic case involves financial aid programs such as school
voucher schemes. Exclusion from other programs may require a somewhat different
analysis. Denying civil service or construction contracts to religious persons alone, for
instance, would likely violate the rule against unconstitutional conditions defended
below. See infra Part II.1B.
5 See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971) (finding constitutional an act
that was "carefully drafted to ensure that the federally subsidized facilities would be
devoted to the secular and not the religious functions of the recipient institutions").
6 This Article does not address another pressing question-whether the govern-
ment may deny funding to a category of groups that is defined without regard to relig-
ion, even if refusing aid in this general manner will disadvantage observant groups.
For instance, lower courts have divided on whether public universities can refuse to
recognize all student groups that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, de-
spite the fact that some of these groups claim theological reasons for discriminating
against gay men and lesbians in the selection of leaders. Compare Christian Legal Soc'y
v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 867 (7th Cir. 2006) (ruling in favor of the Christian Legal So-
ciety (CLS) and against the university), with Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of Univ. of
Cal. v. Kane, No. 04-4484, 2006 WL 997217, at *27 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2006) (ruling
against CLS on a similar claim). For a treatment of excluding expressive associations,
see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN.
L. REv. 1919 (2006). Such policies do not exclude religion as such, but instead deny
support to a class of persons and organizations defined on some facially religion-
neutral basis. This Article, by contrast, concerns laws and policies that either facially or
purposefully single out religious actors.
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forms of state aid to flow to religious organizations. Consider two ex-
amples of this phenomenon. First, the Court has approved school
voucher programs that include religious educational institutions.
That rule permits indirect aid, meaning funding that flows to religious
entities only via the genuinely independent choice of private indi-
viduals. Second, the Court now also allows some direct aid. Two deci-
sions have permitted Congress to directly subsidize religious and non-
religious schools in certain ways, 9 and both required the Court to
overrule more restrictive precedents.'0 So with respect to important
forms of government funding, both indirect and direct, excluding re-
ligion may have shifted from a constitutional mandate to a policy op-
tion. Put in terms of a common metaphor, the gap has widened be-
tween the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, giving public
officials greater discretion over whether to support observance. Law-
makers must now confront the question of whether it is a good idea to
fund religion in these newly permissible ways."
At the moment, Supreme Court doctrine in this area is inconsis-
tent. First, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, the
Court held that a public university could not elect to fund all student
publications without also funding religious ones. 12 But in Locke v.
Davey, the Court's latest free exercise decision, the Justices approved a
college scholarship program for all top students except those major-
ing in devotional theology. 13 Although these two decisions may ap-
pear to address different areas of law-free speech and free exercise,
7 See NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERIcA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM-AND
WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT 210-11 (2005) (describing a series of major decisions
in the 1990s and 2000s relaxing restrictions on government funding of religion).
8 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion); Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997).
10 Mitchell 530 U.S. at 835 (overruling Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), and
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235-36 (overruling Agui-
lar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), and partially overruling Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985)).
u Of course, the problem of excluding religion may have been confronted in ear-
lier historical periods, before the Court began applying the Establishment Clause to
the states, though it would not have been the focus of federal cases. See, e.g., PHILIP
HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 363 (2002) (discussingJudd v. Board
of Education, 15 N.E.2d 576, 581-82 (N.Y. 1938), which addressed the separation of
church and state in public schools under the New York Constitution).
12 515 U.S. 819, 828-31 (1995).
13 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004). Certain other academic and financial criteria applied
as well. Id. at 716.
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respectively-they actually stand in tension with one another: one
permitted an exclusion of religion, and the other did not.14
This Article argues that the state generally ought to be allowed
considerable latitude to exclude religious activities and actors from its
support, at least as a constitutional matter. The government need not
remain neutral toward religion in its support programs; it may instead
sometimes fund one activity rather than another, even when doing so
may skew private incentives toward nonreligious activities and mes-
sages, so long as it observes certain limitations that this Article will
carefully delineate.
This is so partly because free exercise is best conceptualized pri-
marily (though not exclusively) as a right to liberty or autonomy that,
like other such rights, may be selectively funded without burdening its
exercise and triggering constitutional objections.1 5 Elsewhere in con-
stitutional law, particularly in the areas of speech and privacy, officials
are permitted to subsidize the exercise of certain rights without aiding
others.16 They may do so even though selective support may have the
effect of influencing private choices. To the degree that religious lib-
erty is analogous to those other rights, doctrine surrounding them
lends support to the constitutionality of excluding religion.
Partly, too, allowing exclusions of religion is attractive because of
considerations that are specific to religious freedom. A legislature
might decline to facilitate religion for good reasons, such as promot-
ing equal citizenship for members of minority faiths (or no faith at
all), fostering community concord, or respecting taxpayers' freedom
of conscience." Each of these three purposes arguably promotes an
Establishment Clause value. Antiestablishment theory, in other words,
provides justifications for permitting exclusions of religion even where
14 A footnote in Davey, 540 U.S. at 720 n.3, that purported to resolve the tension
by distinguishing Rosenberger as a speech case fooled few. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock,
Comment, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the
Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 191-93 (2004) (acknowledging
the conflict between Davey and Rosenberger); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny
Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on
"Equal Access"for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 653, 711-12 (1996)
(arguing, before Davey was decided, that Rosenberger prohibits exclusions of religion
from voucher schemes).
15 See Nelson Tebbe, Free Exercise and the Problem of Symmetry, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 699,
703-05 (2005).
16 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (speech); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464 (1977) (privacy and reproductive rights); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455
(1973) (parental right to choose private school).
17 See sources cited infta notes 33-38.
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it does not provide rationales for requiring them. The government may
exclude religion in order to pursue a stricter vision of antiestablishment
than the First Amendment requires, at least within certain limits.
Although some readers will find this Article's argument intuitive,
others are likely to resist its position. Few leading scholars have ad-
dressed the issue so far, but those who have done so generally have
voiced serious constitutional concerns with unequal funding of obser-18
vance. Whereas the government once was constitutionally required
to exclude religion from various types of support because of antiestab-
lishment rules, these writers think that today it ought to be con-
strained in the other direction-the state should be prohibited by free
exercise and free speech principles from differentiating on the basis
of religion and influencing private decisions concerning matters of
conscience. They see a constitutional obligation to treat religious
groups and practices evenhandedly, even with respect to funding. So
far, the literature has not provided a fulsome response.
Part I sets out the basic argument with respect to religious prac-
tices. To simplify for a moment, the government may decide which
activities and institutions it wishes to facilitate, even if that means se-
lecting out religious ones. A critical distinction separates differentia-
tion in regulation, which is often subject to close judicial scrutiny,
from differentiation in support, which remains largely within the dis-
cretion of the democratic branches. Again, that is true both because
religious liberty should be conceptualized largely as a right to liberty
or autonomy that need not be equally funded to be protected, and
also because of religion-specific antiestablishment rationales. Con-
temporary conditions of pervasive welfare-state programming certainly
do weaken the arguments for excluding religion in certain contexts,
but the resulting exceptions are narrower than some have suggested.
18 See Laycock, supra note 14, at 199 (calling one instance where the government
funded secular programs, but not comparable religious programs, "rank discrimina-
tion"); see also CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
AND THE CONSTITUTION 222-27 (2007) (arguing generally against differentiation on
the basis of religion, even in funding, while taking a nuanced position on Davey itself).
Some older articles treated (and opposed) Supreme Court rulings that required the
nonfunding of religion as a constitutional matter-a different topic from the one ad-
dressed in this Article. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem:
Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989 (1991); Paulsen, supra note 14, at
710-17; see also Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAMEJ.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POLY 341, 365 (1999) (arguing that equal funding of religion not only
is constitutionally permitted, but also should be constitutionally required).
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Part II extends the argument to state support of religious speech.'9
Here, too, the government generally can excise religious messages
from its own communications. It may decide, for instance, to display
only secular holiday symbols without also showing menorahs or
creches. More difficult to defend is the exclusion of sacred messages
from programs that support a range of private views.2 ° Although this
Article argues that Rosenberger is mistaken, it contends that even if that
decision is not overruled, some room to exclude religious speech may
remain. Perhaps the closest question today is whether the govern-
ment is required to allow worship itself to take place on public prem-
ises whenever it opens them to speech by civic organizations. This Ar-
ticle disfavors such a rule even though there is strong support for it in
the jurisprudence. Influential circuit judges have recently split on the
issue, prompting one of them to call for its resolution by the Supreme
Court.21
Part III draws five limits to this Article's proposal that the govern-
ment be allowed to aid observance selectively. Each articulates a
bright-line rule that may be administered without the exercise of ex-
cessive judicial discretion, and each is defended with careful theoreti-
cal arguments. First, the government may not target particular sects
for disfavored treatment in its support programs, just as it is prohib-
22ited from doing so in its regulations. Second, it generally may not
19 Although aiding religious exercise is obviously different from aiding religious
messages, it makes sense to consider these forms of support together. Within the cate-
gory of speech, it also makes sense to compare government speech that works to ad-
vance religion with government support of private religious speech. For example, a
town's display of religious holiday symbols supports the affected religions in much the
same way as its decision to open up its property for the private display of those same
symbols. Finally, it is sensible to analogize a government willingness to let its facilities
be used by a variety of private speakers to its actual funding of those speakers. See Le-
gal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543-44 (2001) (drawing on public forum
cases for guidance in a subsidy decision).
20 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (invalidating an exclusion
of sectarian speakers from an otherwise general government support program).
21 See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2007)
(vacating ajudgment prohibiting an exclusion of worship, with a split vote on the mer-
its and one vote to vacate on ripeness grounds); id. at 132 (Walker, J., dissenting)
("[T]here is no doubt that this particular dispute ... would benefit from a more con-
clusive resolution by [the Supreme] Court."); see also Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic
Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 911 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding an exclusion of wor-
ship from public facilities), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 148 (2007).
22 See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982) (invalidating a rule that ex-
empted from certain registration and reporting requirements only religious organiza-
tions that receive more than half of their total contributions from members and affili-
ated organizations).
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defund one activity by a religious group simply because that group is
exercising its constitutional right to engage in some other religious
activity using private funds. That is, the government may not violate
the rule against unconstitutional conditions.13 Third, exclusions of re-
ligion may not be driven by antireligious animus, a term this Article de-
24fines narrowly.
The remaining limits apply to exclusions of religious speech. The
fourth prohibits the government from engaging in viewpoint dis-
crimination when it subsidizes a range of private expression.
25 Re-
gardless of whether treating exclusions of religious perspectives as
viewpoint discrimination makes sense as a matter of theory-
something this Article will question-the Court is sure to continue to
treat them that way as a practical matter. Fifth, and finally, state actors
are presumptively prohibited from banning religious speech from tra-
ditional public fora, such as parks or sidewalks.26 That last rule may be
understood not as an independent limit but instead as an articulation
of a boundary of the main principle, since access to such fora is best
seen not as a subsidy but rather as a baseline benefit that all citizens
enjoy. Restricting access to them is closer to regulation than to a de-
nial of aid, on that view.
Part V concludes by drawing out some of the argument's implica-
tions for a question of constitutional theory, namely whether and how
it is appropriate for a democracy to influence citizen choice concern-
ing commitments of conscience. This Article sets out a framework
that may aid analysis of that difficult question. And to the degree that
excluding religion has analogues elsewhere in constitutional law, this
Article's proposal provides a way of thinking about the (limited) abil-
ity of a constitutional democracy to incentivize private behavior across
23 See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (invalidating
grants given only to those broadcasting stations that do not engage in editorializing);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (invalidating a tax exemption conditioned
on taking an antisubversion oath).
24 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004). This Article does not distinguish
between the terms "differentiation" and "discrimination." In this regard, it follows
what seems to be the practice of at least some members of the Court. See, e.g., id. at
726 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law
not discriminate on its face." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993)). Instead, I
carefully separate out the term "animus." See infra Part III.C.
25 See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679
(1992).
26 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
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a wider range of constitutionally protected activity. In more instances
than those that have generally been recognized, the government may
be able to encourage protected behavior that it considers worthwhile.
I. EXCLUDING RELIGIOUS PRACTICE
This Part sets out the argument with respect to exclusions of reli-
gious practice from government support, first by defending such ex-
clusions on theoretical grounds and then by showing how that defense
links up with jurisprudence surrounding other rights to individual lib-
erty or autonomy. It concludes by anticipating and addressing several
objections.
A. The Basic Argument
When the government elects not to support the exercise of reli-
gious liberty, it should not normally be seen to be violating the right
to free exercise, even though it might not be able to prohibit the reli-
gious activity directly. 2 That argument depends on a fundamental
distinction between governmental regulation and support.2 8 Whereas
the state has only limited power to target religious groups for special
regulation, it has a much greater ability to select them for denials of
aid. Constitutional theory can support that distinction by construing
free exercise primarily as a fight to liberty or autonomy that is more
readily burdened by regulation than by a state decision to withhold a
subsidy. 29 When the government singles out religious actors and enti-
ties for denials of support, it frequently leaves them just as free to ob-
serve their faith as they were before the government program existed.
Constitutional democracies must obey a negative prohibition on inter-
fering with individual liberty of conscience, of course, but it does not
27 The idea that the government may defund religious activity that it may not be
able to prohibit should be familiar. In Bob Jones University v. United States, for instance,
the Court assumed that the federal government could not prevent the school from
imposing a religiously based rule against interracial dating. 461 U.S. 574, 593-94
(1983). Nevertheless, it held that the IRS could refuse to extend a tax exemption to a
school that engaged in such a practice. Id. at 604.
28 Thanks to Bruce Ackerman for emphasizing this distinction.
See Tebbe, supra note 15, at 723-32 (expounding a "liberty conception" of free
exercise). That view of free exercise, which interprets the provision primarily as a right
to autonomy, is not exclusive. Free exercise also includes certain freestanding com-
mitments to government evenhandedness, such as the guarantee of neutrality between
denominations or sects. See infra Part III.A (delving into the doctrine of nonpreferen-
tialism).
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follow that they have an obligation to facilitate observance on equal
term s.S
On something like that theory, constitutional law in various areas
allows the government to selectively subsidize the exercise of auton-
omy-based rights, as the next Section will explain more fully. That is
true even when selective funding has the effect of skewing private in-
centives toward behavior that policymakers believe to be valuable. So,
for instance, legislatures may facilitate public education but not pri-
vate education, or marriage rather than cohabitation, even though
both private schooling and cohabitation may be constitutionally pro-
tected. Of course, a government's ability to pick and choose may be
supported by considerations that are specific to the right at issue. But
viewed at a sufficiently high level of abstraction, constitutional law can
be seen to allow selective support on the theory that basic liberties
normally are not fundamentally impeded when they are denied subsi-
dies.3 Excluding religion likewise ought to be permitted in many cir-
cumstances, leaving to lawmakers the question of whether it is good
policy to support observance, sacred practices, and the like.
Here, selective support of religion can also be justified based on
arguments of constitutional theory that are particular to religious lib-
erty." After all, religion jurisprudence has its own detailed set of ar-
guments concerning government support, namely those that surround
the Establishment Clause. Three antiestablishment considerations
stand out among the ones that officials might reasonably consider.
30 But see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 415-16 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring
in the judgment) ("I think that the guarantee of religious liberty embodied in the Free
Exercise Clause affirmatively requires government to create an atmosphere of hospital-
ity and accommodation to individual belief and disbelief. In short, I think our Consti-
tution commands the positive protection by government of religious freedom.... .").
31 This Article does not analogize religious liberty to equal protection, which more
readily prohibits discrimination in government support programs. See infra note 111.
Free exercise and antiestablishment include some guarantees of neutrality and equal-
ity, but these are specific to religious freedom and thus not profitably considered part
of the more general right to equal protection.
32 I assume here that religion is special in the sense that government decision
makers might legitimately conclude that funding sectarian institutions poses particular
dangers to equal citizenship, community stability, and religious freedom. Religion
need not be considered unique as a matter of abstract argument for this approach to
work. Cf Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 25 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming
2008) (critiquing the uniqueness of religion on theoretical grounds). Rather, the idea
here is that lawmakers may take into account the fact that religion has long been
thought to occupy a special place in American history and tradition. This Article
brackets any further consideration of the notoriously difficult questions surrounding
the particularity of religion as compared to other deeply held commitments.
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First, policymakers might deny funding to sacred institutions in order
to protect and promote equal citizenship for people who belong to
unrepresented faiths or to no faith at all.33 Officials might reasonably
decide that funding religious entities would damage equal citizen-
ship because only certain sects would in fact take up the offer of
support.3 That could create a situation in which the government
became identified with a particular sect or sects as a practical mat-
ter-however mistakenly-so that people not affiliated with those
faiths would come to view themselves as belonging to disfavored
classes of citizens. 5
Second, lawmakers may believe that staying out of the business of
supporting religion will foster community harmony and avoid harmful
36unrest or division. They might reasonably conclude that aiding re-
ligion, even on equal terms with other groups, would highlight differ-
ences of identity among citizens in a way that disrupts peace within
the polity and damages social solidarity.37
Finally, funding sacred practices might reasonably be seen to im-
pede the religious freedom of taxpayers who object to supporting in-
33 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom,
74 TEx. L. REv. 577, 601 (1996) (book review) (including equal citizenship as one
facet of a theory of religious freedom); Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, Recip-
rocity, the Religion Clauses and Equal Citizenship, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/
07/reciprocity-religion-clauses-and-equal.html (July 1, 2005, 22:30 EST) ("I have always
believed that at the heart of the jurisprudence of the religion clauses is the problem of
securing equal citizenship in a country whose citizens have very different and some-
times contradictory beliefs about religion. The goal of the religion clauses is twofold-
first, to preserve religious conscience, and second, to ensure equal citizenship for all
persons regardless of their religious beliefs.").
Cf Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a relig-
ion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.").
35 See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 105 n.8 (2d Cir.
2007) (Calabresi, J.) (describing reasonable grounds on which school officials decided
not to allow worship by private groups after hours on school property, including a de-
sire to avoid allowing public school buildings to become "identified with the church"
in such a way that "members of the community who are not church members would
feel 'marginalized'" (emphasis omitted)); Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist.
No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 214 (2d Cir. 1997) ("We think that it is reasonable for state legis-
lators and school authorities to avoid the identification of a middle school with a par-
ticular church.").
See Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 CEO. L.J.
1667 (2006) (analyzing, but not endorsing, this argument).
37 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment) (explaining that a "basic purpose[] of [the Religion] Clauses" is "to avoid
that divisiveness based upon religion that promotes social conflict, sapping the
strength of government and religion alike").
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stitutions with which they differ as a matter of conscience. While this
consideration has not often blocked the flow of public funds to reli-
gious organizations in the modem era, it has some pedigree in
American constitutional history.& Without adopting any of these
three rationales as justifications for Establishment Clause doctrine,
this Article contends only that they provide religion-specific reasons
for allowing officials to decide not to facilitate religious practices.
All three of these rationales are contested in contemporary
American society. Cutting in the opposite direction are plausible in-
terests such as a desire to promote the equal citizenship of religious
people or an aim to facilitate free exercise. And, conceivably, exclud-
ing religion could produce more civil strife, not less. 39 The point here
is simply that it makes sense to allow lawmakers themselves to resolve
these issues when they decide whether to carve out sectarian institu-
tions from government programs. That is, even if antiestablishment
concerns like the three described above do not mandate exclusion of
religious individuals and institutions-something that the Court has
decided in the context of school vouchers, for instance -they should
nevertheless cut in favor of allowing policymakers to decide whether
41to extend such programs to sectarian groups.
It should be emphasized that this Article urges only that the op-
tion of excluding religion should be available to the democratic
branches. Put in terms of political process theory, the idea is that de-
mocratically elected representatives should retain discretion to de-
cline to fund religious practices for defensible policy reasons. Implicit
in that argument is the assumption that deciding whether to allow se-
lective funding will not normally present problems of political dys-
function. There is no a priori reason to suspect that religious groups,
taken as a whole, will not be able to band together and protect them-
selves from loss of funding or other support through the normal
channels of democratic decision making. Certainly, the story might
be different if particular sects were singled out by the legislature, but
38 Coercing taxpayers was a concern that figured prominently at the time of the
Founding and has recently been revitalized by prominent thinkers. See FELDMAN, supra
note 7, at 37-38 (describing Madison's view).
39 Thanks to Robert Tsai for pressing this point in correspondence.
40 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
41 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 289 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing
that exclusion of religion ought to be permitted on the ground that the state has a
"sufficiently strong" interest in providing greater protection against the establishment
of religion than is required by the Constitution).
EXCLUDING RELIGION
one of the limits set out in Part III prohibits that degree of specific-
ity.42 With that prohibition in place, it is possible and indeed probable
that faiths and denominations will be able to form political coalitions
to effectively oppose denials of support that affect them all equally, or
at least enough to generate political sympathy and interest alignment.
Whether to fund religious practices and entities is a question of public
values that the legislature is best positioned to resolve, for familiar rea-
sons of institutional competence. The argument, therefore, is not
that selective support is an attractive policy choice in every (or any)
circumstance. This Article does not weigh in on whether, for in-
stance, voucher programs work best without religious schools. It urges
only that, as a constitutional matter, legislatures should be able to
make that determination.43
Would it be permissible to exclude religion even from broad wel-
fare-state programs? Because such programs arguably shift the base-
line level of benefits that all citizens are entitled to expect, some
might worry that excluding religion from them would exert a coercive
effect. Imagine, for instance, a law that denied police and fire protec-
tion to churches, or one that extended significant subsidies to all day
care centers except religious ones, or one that allowed government
funding to flow only to nonsectarian hospitals. If exclusions of relig-
ion from programs like these could not fairly be said to leave practi-
tioners as free to pursue their faiths as they were before the programs
were enacted, they might be thought to raise constitutional concerns.
In all candor, this worry may be difficult to allay on the level of
constitutional theory. It raises the notoriously thorny problem of
where to set the baseline level of government benefits when consider-
ing whether a denial should count as a hindrance rather than as a
42 See infra Part III.A.
43 For an important set of arguments surrounding school vouchers, see PETER H.
SCHUcK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 297-307
(2003).
Federalism considerations provide further support for allowing the practice of ex-
cluding religion to continue among the states. Although this Article does not leverage
those arguments, they play an important role in the literature. Of particular interest
here are works that support the Court's decision in Davey on federalism grounds. E.g.,
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19, 67-83 (2006);
Jesse R. Merriam, Finding a Ceiling in a Circular Room: Locke v. Davey, Federalism, and
Religious Neutrality, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTs. L. REv. 103, 106 (2007). Many states pro-
vide greater antiestablishment protection than the Court requires as a matter of fed-
eral law. Sometimes they do so under state constitutional provisions, known as "Blaine
Amendments," and sometimes they do so in other ways. This dimension of the prob-
lem is rich-too rich to be treated adequately here.
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simple decision not to subsidize. 44 Yet in practice, concrete examples
of such carve-outs from fundamental state benefits turn out to be rare.
Most broad government programs have traditionally extended public
goods to religious groups on equal terms. And even where instances
of excluding religion from such programs are possible to imagine,
they can usually be adequately addressed by one or another of the lim-
its set out in Part III. So, for instance, selecting sectarian institutions
for denial of police or fire protection would almost certainly violate
the rule against animus toward religion . That is so because denying
basic municipal services to churches, synagogues, and mosques ap-
pears so unconnected to any legitimate basis for excluding religion
that the practice could only be motivated by a discriminatory purpose
and not by any legitimate policy.
Selectively defunding only religious day care centers or hospitals
presents a more difficult question. But excluding religion in those ways
would run up against the second limitation described in Part III: the
prohibition of unconstitutional conditions. A government violates this
rule when it denies benefits to a religious entity simply because the
46group chooses to engage in free exercise using private funds. The
government thus cannot withhold funding to day care centers or hospi-
tals simply because they are religiously affiliated. Now, certainly, the
state could require them to segregate out secular and sectarian func-
tions as a condition of funding, making it possible to fund only secular
social services without also subsidizing religious observances. 7 It could
not, however, refuse to subsidize even the secular operations of social
service institutions simply because of their religious affiliations. None
of this is to say that the problem is easy to solve. Yet the hope of this Ar-
ticle is that a combination of the limits set out in Part III could do much
to mollify the concern that excluding religion would become coercive
48or unfair when applied to broad government entitlements.
44 For a more comprehensive take on this "baseline problem," see Tebbe, supra
note 15, at 722-23.
45 See infta Part III.C.
46 See infra Part III.B.
47 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198 (1991) (holding that Congress may re-
quire recipients of federal family planning funds to separate out nonfunded counsel-
ing and referral services concerning abortions); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468
U.S. 364, 400 (1984) (noting that Congress could fund only noneditorializing broad-
cast activities if it allowed public broadcasting stations to segregate out and separately
fund their editorializing activities).48
If there were an exclusion of religion from a broad welfare entitlement that was
not prohibited by this Article's mechanisms, any infringement on religious freedom
EXCLUDING RELIGION
One way to think about excluding religion is as the rough inverse
of legislative accommodation-i.e., the practice of singling out reli-
gious actors for special exemptions from regulatory laws. Legislative
accommodations typically provide greater protection to free exercise
than is constitutionally required. Consider, for instance, the statute
that allows Native Americans to use peyote despite the drug laws.45 Or
think of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), which gives special protection to prisoners seeking to ex-
ercise their religion. ° Accommodations like these are regularly up-
held even though they often have the effect of advantaging religious
actors over those who would like to act similarly for deeply held secu-
lar reasons. 5' That is, they favor religious actors by skewing private
decision making toward religious choices. A secular person who
wishes to use peyote has an incentive to become a member of the Na-
tive American Church, for instance. Exclusions of religion from gov-
ernment support, on the other hand, promote a stricter vision of anti-
establishment than is constitutionally required. And, as I argue, they
too are often constitutional even though they may disincentivize sa-
cred practices relative to comparable secular activities. Differentiating
on the basis of religious observance is permissible, regardless of any
incentive effect that it might create in either direction, so long as it
does not unduly interfere with free exercise or run afoul of some
other constitutional principle.52
that it imposed could conceivably be invalidated by general free exercise principles.
SeeTebbe, supra note 15, at 729-32.
49 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b) (2000). Absent the statutory exemption, Native Americans
would not have a constitutional right to use peyote without being punished under the
Controlled Substances Act. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990)
(leaving religious exemptions from drug laws up to the legislature).
50 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720-21 (2005) (upholding RLUIPA's
prison provisions against an Establishment Clause challenge while acknowledging that
observant inmates would receive less protection tinder the Constitution than they do
under RLUIPA).
51 See Tebbe, supra note 15, at 714 (arguing that many legislative accommodations
have the effect, if not the purpose, of advantaging religious actors in this way).
52 Of course, the precise inverse of excluding religion-that is, singling out obser-
vance for special subsidization-would most often violate the Establishment Clause. It
is difficult to imagine that such a program could have a governmental purpose that did
not favor religion and was not impermissible for that reason. Exclusions of religion, by
contrast, need not be motivated by antireligious animus, and in fact may not be. See
infra Part IlI.C. For instance, state constitutional provisions that enact strong anties-
tablishment commitments have not been found to constitute impermissible discrimi-
nations against religion. See, e.g., Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119,
1122-23 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) (holding that a ban on certain funding under the
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This Article's basic argument draws much of its support from
Davey. 5  Although that decision has met with criticism from leading
commentators, 54 it sensibly extends the Court's rulings in other areas
of constitutional law to free exercise and rightly indicates that exclud-
ing religion ought to be constitutional in a variety of circumstances.
55
The Davey Court approved an exclusion of religion-for the first
time -by a remarkably lopsided vote of seven to two.57 Washington
state had established a scholarship program for talented high school
students who graduated near the top of their class, who planned to at-
tend an accredited university within the state, and who met certain in-
come requirements. Students could use the awards to defray educa-
tion-related costs at any accredited institution, whether public or
private, religious or secular. One narrow restriction was imposed:
awards could not be used to support students who planned to major
in devotional theology, a term that everyone understood to mean the
study of religion from a faith perspective. 8 Joshua Davey won a schol-
arship on the merits but then lost it when he declared a dual major in
devotional theology and business administration-a combination de-
signed to prepare him for a career in the clergy.
state constitution did not constitute purposeful discrimination on the basis of relig-
ion). Similarly, legislative accommodations driven by an intent to favor a particular
religious practice are not proper. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (characterizing the
"secular legislative purpose" requirement as preventing lawmakers "from abandoning
neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in reli-
gious matters").
53 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
54 See, e.g., EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 18, at 226 (taking issue with Davey's ra-
tionale); Laycock, supra note 14, at 199 (arguing that Davey opens the door for the gov-
ernment to "offer[] broad conditional subsidies and buy[] up the right to free exercise
of religion").
55 For an argument that the Davey Court missed an opportunity to declare that
equal funding of religious entities is not required, see Frank S. Ravitch, Locke v. Davey
and the Lose-Lose Scenario: What Davey Could Have Said, but Didn't, 40 TuLSA L. REv. 255,
256 (2004).
'6 Davey's only harbinger was dicta indicating that a constitutionally required exclu-
sion of sectarian schools from a tuition reimbursement scheme would not itself violate
other provisions of the Constitution. See Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 834 (1973)
("[V]alid aid to nonpublic, nonsectarian schools would provide no lever for aid to
their sectarian counterparts."). Perhaps because Sloan addressed the different ques-
tion of whether excluding religion was required, not whether it was permitted, it was
not even cited in Davey.
57 Davey, 540 U.S. at 713; see also EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 18, at 223 (calling
the seven votes an "overwhelming majority," at least "in this field").
M Davey, 540 U.S. at 716.
EXCLUDING RELIGION
Everyone acknowledged that the state could have included minis-
terial training in its scholarship program without violating the federal
Establishment Clause. 59 The issue was whether Washington could pur-
sue a stricter vision of antiestablishment than the federal Constitution
required, now as a matter of state policy, or whether it would instead
be constitutionally compelled to fund theology majors once it decided
to support other exceptional students.6 °
Questions at oral argument revealed a concern among some of
the Justices that ruling for Davey would impair the ability of policy-
makers to exclude religion in other contexts-especially in school
voucher programs. In a particularly illuminating exchange, counsel
for Joshua Davey was asked about this issue:
QUESTION: Suppose a state has a school voucher program such as the
Court indicated [in Zelman] could be upheld .... Now, if the state de-
cides not to give school vouchers for use in religious or parochial
schools, do you take the position it must, that it has to do one or the
other? It can have a voucher program, but if it does, it has to fund all
private and religious schools with a voucher program?
MR. SEKULOW: No, I think-....
QUESTION: Well, why not? I mean, why wouldn't it follow from what
you are saying today?...
QUESTION: Can [the state] refrain from making that program avail-
able for use in religious schools?
MR. SEKULOW: I-I would think not. I think once it would go towards
the private schools, as long as the eligibility-
QUESTION: So what you're urging here would have a major impact,
then, would it not, on-on voucher programs?
MR. SEKULOW: Well, it would.6'
59 See id. at 719 (citing Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,
487 (1986)).
W Of course, states are generally free to provide greater protection for individual
rights than what is required by the federal Constitution. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that a state law extending free speech and
petition rights to the grounds of a privately owned public shopping center is constitu-
tional).
61 Transcript of Oral Argument at 31-32, Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315).
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Subsequently, one Justice worried aloud that "quite a few state laws
and constitutional provisions around the country" might be unconsti-
tutional if Davey went the wrong way. From these questions, it ap-
pears that the wider practice of excluding religion was itself seen to be
at stake.
Given these concerns, it is no surprise that the Court upheld the
Washington scholarship program. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion emphasized that Washington's was a funding program, not a
regulation. He therefore applied what he implicitly took to be a gen-
eral constitutional rule concerning funding, namely, that a govern-
ment's refusal to subsidize the exercise of a constitutional right is not
generally seen as burdening that right. Washington's funding exclu-
sion "impose [d] neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of re-
ligious service or rite [and did] not deny to ministers the right to par-
ticipate in the political affairs of the community.03  Instead of
enacting any direct prohibition, "[t] he State ha [d] merely chosen not
to fund a distinct category of instruction." Chief Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that excluding devotional degrees from the state's funding
program "place[d] a relatively minor burden" on students like
65Davey. Passages like these support the view that Davey turned on an
examination of the relationship between government funding and in-
dividual liberty or autonomy, and in particular on a judgment that ex-
cluding religion from the Washington program did not burden
Joshua Davey in the same way that direct regulation might have."6
62 Id. at 33-34.
63 Davey, 540 U.S. at 720.
6 Id. at 721.
65 Id. at 725.
W Here I agree with Professor Laycock that Davey came out the way it did largely
because the government's differentiation on the basis of religion did not impose a sig-
nificant burden on Davey's ability to pursue his calling. See Laycock, supra note 14, at
214 ("[T]he unifying theme [in Davey] is that facial discrimination against religion is
presumptively unconstitutional if, and only if, the discrimination burdens a religious
practice.... [A] mere refusal to fund does not impose a substantial burden."). I also
agree that the Court's no-burden approach is difficult to apply outside the area of
funding-as, for instance, in the context of religious speech. See infra Part II.
Some experts think the outcome in Davey depended not on the absence of a bur-
den, but instead on the lack of governmental "animus" toward religion. See, e.g., Marci
A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good, 2004 BYU L.
REV. 1099, 1101-02. My own reading is that the Davey Court probably did not mean to
suggest that a showing of antireligious animus was necessary to make out a constitu-
tional claim, though it did indicate that such a showing would be sufficient. See infta
Part III.C.
EXCLUDING RELIGION
Justice Scalia dissented in Davey, noting that the Court's holding
flew in the face of its longstanding rule that facial discrimination on
the basis of religion was presumptively unconstitutional-and not only
in the context of regulation.17 The Davey Court approved a scholar-
ship program that singled out religion for special disfavor, seemingly
in blatant violation of that "neutrality" principle. Justice Scalia pro-
tested that "[i]f the Religion Clauses demand neutrality, we must en-
force them, in hard cases as well as easy ones." s The majority's rule,
he said, could justify excluding religion from public programs in a
69wide variety of contexts.
That Davey helps to justify exclusions of religion in a number of
circumstances is this Article's contention exactly. In Section D of this
Part, I will respond to Justice Scalia's view that discrimination on the
basis of religion is always suspect, regardless of whether it appears in
the context of regulation or support. That Section will also anticipate
and counter a related objection, that the government should avoid in-
fluencing private decision making regarding matters of conscience-
so that although it may elect not to fund religious exercise generally,
it should not do so where it supports some substitute activity that pre-
sents a direct alternative to observance. 0 In contrast to both of these
Others believe Davey is limited to funding carve-outs for practices of particular re-
ligious intensity, such as training for the clergy. See Laycock, supra note 14, at 184-87
(assessing this argument and calling training for the clergy "an essentially religious en-
deavor" (quoting Davey, 540 U.S. at 721)). Although this interpretation is reasonable,
it is unlikely to control future cases. Id. at 185-86. As Professor Laycock points out,
religious intensity has not mattered much in the Court's decisions regarding the ques-
tion of what a government may fund without violating the Establishment Clause. It is
thus less likely that the Justices will rely on that factor when considering what a gov-
ernment must fund. Id. at 186. For this Article, the salient point is that a government
may legitimately come to believe that refusing to fund religious practices will serve de-
sirable policy ends, even if those practices are not as "essentially religious" as studying
to become a cleric.
67 Davey, 540 U.S. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Church of the Lukumi Ba-
balu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)).
68 Id. at 728.
69 Id. at 730.
70 Judge McConnell advocates a "presumptive obligation to fund abortions when
the government funds childbirth, and to fund religious schools when it funds secular
schools, unless there is a plausible, non-hostile reason for the selective funding."
McConnell, supra note 18, at 1046. That follows from a general idea that "[glov-
ernment must keep its hands off" certain protected choices. Id. at 995. While he
agrees that, ordinarily, merely refusing to subsidize the exercise of a constitutional
right will not skew private incentives, funding only one of two "substitute" protected
activities may do so and therefore would require special justifications related to the
nature of the particular right being excluded. Id. at 1001-03.
20081 1281
1282 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 156:1263
positions, this Article argues that the government may exclude religion
even when doing so influences private choices regarding matters of
conscience, so long as it does not violate any of the limits set out in Part
III, some of which guarantee basic autonomy in matters of conscience
and others of which articulate freestanding commitments to evenhand-
edness. The remedy for disagreement with government policies that
skew private decision making away from religious choices lies in the
usual processes of democratic lawmaking, not in a constitutional court.
B. Other Rights
Constitutional law commonly allows the government to subsidize
the exercise of certain constitutional rights and not others. Selective
support in these other areas is analogous to the practice of excluding
religion. For instance, legislatures may support childbirth and not
abortion, even though a woman's freedom to terminate an early preg-• . 71
nancy is constitutionally protected. In the words of the Court, "There
is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected
activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant
with legislative policy."7, 2 Merely electing not to fund the exercise of a
liberty or autonomy right leaves its holder roughly as unencumbered as
he or she was in the absence of any government benefit program.
Similarly, parents have a constitutional right to send their chil-
dren to private school.7 3 A state therefore cannot use its truancy laws
to prevent religious parents from opting out of public schools and in-
stead educating their children in a private setting. Yet the govern-
ment does have the power to encourage public schooling by funding
only public schools.7 4 In other words, it is permitted to incentivize
only public schooling, even though the freedom to send a child to
private school enjoys the status of a constitutional right. Nebraska, for
71 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). It is
conceivable that a funding exclusion could be overturned if found to impose an undue
burden on a woman's ability to obtain an abortion. Planned Parenthood v. Casey of Se.
Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992). Given the Court's view that virtually no abortion funding
ought to be considered part of the welfare-state baseline of entitlements, however, it is
difficult to imagine a denial of support that, in its view, would impose such a burden.
Perhaps the government has some duty to facilitate abortions in the prison context.
This Section is indebted to Eugene Volokh's discussion, in a different context, of
what he calls "The No Duty To Subsidize Principle." SeeVolokh, supra note 6, at 1925-27.
72 Maher, 432 U.S. at 475.
73 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
74 Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973).
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example, was forbidden from criminalizing the teaching of foreign
languages to students below the eighth grade in all public and private
schools, but nevertheless it remained free to exclude German from
the curriculum of its free public schools. 75 Again, policymakers may
not interfere with protected activities, but they may choose to endorse
some of those activities and not others, and they may even use gov-
ernment resources to their advantage and thereby incentivize the
choices they favor.
Moreover, the government may decline to fund advocacy of abor-• 76
tion, even if it subsidizes advocacy of childbirth or abstinence. And
it need not subsidize lobbying by nonprofit organizations, even when
it subsidizes lobbying by veterans' organizations.7 Therefore, with re-
spect to speech, as in other areas, the government "can, without violat-
ing the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain
activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same
time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the
problem in another way."7" To a significant degree, "when the Gov-
ernment appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled
,,79to define the limits of that program.
Is excluding religion really analogous to declining to fund abor-
tion, private schooling, or German classes? Some might resist that
analogy, reasoning that excising religious practices is different from
omitting these other activities because it involves a more targeted de-
nial from broader support programs. And, admittedly, certain exclu-
sions of religion might come closer to some of these selective funding
cases, such as the refusal to offer German classes, than to others, such
as a decision not to fund abortions along with childbirth. Yet Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Davey apparently saw an analogy even to the abor-
tion funding cases. Although he did not explicitly invoke those cases,
his implicit references to them were difficult to miss. s° Recall, for in-
stance, the way in which he characterized Washington's decision as
75 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923).
76 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196-97 (1990).
77 Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550-51 (1983).
78 Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. Though again, excluding religious speech raises special
concerns under existing law. See infta Part II.B.
79 Rust, 500 U.S. at 194. I will show below that this statement does not apply when
the state seeks to appropriate funds to support a wide range of private speech with the
exception of a certain viewpoint. Other limitations on this general statement are set
out in Part Ill, infra.
80 Here I agree with Professor Laycock, who thinks Rehnquist's "paraphrase of
Rust" was "unmistakable." Laycock, supra note 14, at 176.
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"merely [choosing] not to fund a distinct category of instruction. 8'
That formulation resonates with the Court's approval of selective sup-
port in these other areas of constitutional law."' At least when they are
considered at a high enough level of abstraction, its decisions in those
other areas provide some support for the constitutionality of exclud-
ing religion.
Of course, many of the Court's selective funding decisions in the
areas of privacy and speech are controversial, not only as a matter of
politics but also as a matter of constitutional theory. Again, this Arti-
cle shares many of those concerns. Yet even critics of those decisions
may support the constitutionality of excluding religion for two reasons.
First, the Court's abortion and speech cases have strategic value.
Generally, the lawyers and judges who oppose exclusions of religion
tend to be the same people who support selective funding of child-
birth and childbirth-friendly speech. As Michael McConnell has ob-
served, these two positions do not easily cohere.8s By analogizing be-
tween selective support in those areas and in the context of excluding
religion, it is possible to leverage support for the Court's other deci-
sions in the service of excluding religion.
The second reason draws on independent justifications for allow-
ing selective support of religion. As noted above, antiestablishment
considerations support exclusions of religion in ways that do not de-
pend on arguments for selective funding with respect to privacy and
speech.84 So, for reasons of both strategy and principle, even skeptics
of the Court's selective funding cases like Maher and Rust might be
persuaded to support the constitutionality of targeted denials of aid to
religion, at least within certain limits.
C. Examples
Lower courts have upheld funding programs that omit religious
actors. Those decisions have followed an approach similar to the one
81 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 (2004).
82 See Laycock, supra note 14, at 176 & n.126 (comparing Davey's language to that
of Rust and Harris).
83 See McConnell, supra note 18, at 989-90 (pointing out this inconsistency among
commonly held positions on funding of free exercise and abortion). Progressives and
conservatives alike, if they are to preserve the ability of the government to influence
citizen choices where they care about them most, face pressure to develop positions
that treat selective facilitation in a consistent manner across different areas of constitu-
tional law.
84 See supra Part L.A (laying out the basic argument for excluding religion).
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that this Article proposes. Courts have held, for instance, that states
may establish voucher programs that fund students who wish to attend
nonsectarian public or private schools.85 And one court ruled that a
state may decide not to include a faith-based addiction treatment pro-
gram among the choices given to parolees, even though it may fund
86analogous secular programs . Declining to subsidize free exercise, ac-
cording to these decisions, does not amount to an infringement of indi-
vidual liberty-even though selective funding discriminates facially on
the basis of religion and therefore presumptively violates a conception
of free exercise according to which the government lacks authority to
draw disadvantageous distinctions between religion and irreligion.
s7
Laws excluding religion so far have involved programs of indirect
aid-such as school voucher programs-where support flows to reli-
gious organizations only via private individuals, who direct it there ac-S 88
cording to their own genuinely independent choices. Yet it is now
85 See Eulitt ex rel. Eulitt v. Me. Dep't of Educ., 386 F.3d 344 (1st Cir. 2004) (up-
holding the Maine voucher program against a federal constitutional challenge);
Anderson v. Town of Durham, 895 A.2d 944 (Me. 2006) (same); see also Bush v.
Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340, 362-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a provision of
the Florida state constitution prohibiting the use of school vouchers at religious
schools does not violate the federal Free Exercise Clause).
86 See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 981
(W.D. Wis. 2002) (holding, on summary judgment, that excluding faith-based provid-
ers from a program funding certain private-sector substance abuse treatment centers
would not violate the Free Exercise Clause, but coming to that conclusion in the con-
text of a ruling that such an exclusion was constitutionally mandated).
87 See Anderson, 895 A.2d at 959 (holding that merely denying tuition assistance for
sectarian schooling does not substantially burden the constitutional right to attend a
private religious school).
88 Sometimes the Justices draw a further distinction between indirect aid and aid
that goes to a religious organization directly, but only because of a genuinely inde-
pendent choice of a private individual. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 815-20
(2000) (plurality opinion) (making such a distinction in reviewing a federal statute
under which funds supplied by the federal government were used to lend materials
and equipment to public and private schools through state and local agencies); id. at
841-42 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (defending a similar distinction).
The term "indirect" then indicates that aid flows first to the individual, perhaps in the
form of a voucher, and only then to a religious entity. Phrases such as "genuinely in-
dependent and private choices," id. at 810 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
226 (1997)), by contrast, emphasize the control of a citizen, not the path the aid takes
in its journey from the state to a religious entity. Normally, however, indirectness and
the private-choice feature get conflated in the justices' usage. See, e.g., Zelman v. Sim-
mons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002) (juxtaposing "direct aid programs" with "true
private choice programs"). Presumably this is because indirect aid programs virtually
always channel support according to the wishes of private citizens. Conflation of the
terms may also reflect a judgment that there is no constitutionally significant differ-
ence between a true voucher program and one in which aid gets steered directly to a
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possible to imagine a direct aid program that selectively defunds reli-
gious entities. After all, the Court has recently begun to allow some
direct support of faith-based entities, s9 although so far only under
rather narrow circumstances.g The doctrine here is awfully messy and
may well change now thatJustice O'Connor has ceded supervision of
this area to Justice Alito and the Roberts Court. There is little doubt,
however, that the government will continue to enjoy greater ability to
provide direct aid to sacred and secular schools alike.
These shifts in the law surrounding direct aid have opened up an-
other area in which policymakers could decide to exclude religious
entities from assistance. Although no case has yet presented the ques-
tion (at least to my knowledge), 9 ' it is now easy to imagine one. Pic-
ture, for instance, a program that empowered state educational agen-
cies to provide instructional materials to all qualified public and
religious organization according to the free choice of a private citizen. See Freedom
from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880, 882 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner,J.)
(holding that, under the Establishment Clause, "there is no difference between giving
the voucher recipient a piece of paper that directs the public agency to pay the service
provider and the agency's asking the recipient to indicate his preference and paying
the provider whose service he prefers").
89 See, e.g., Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 836 (upholding the appropriation of federal funds
to private religious schools); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding a New
York City program providing remedial education in sectarian schools).
90 Direct aid may not be used for religious purposes, at least according to Justice
O'Connor's controlling opinion in Mitchell. 530 U.S. at 867. And under both Justice
O'Connor's approach and the Mitchell plurality opinion, direct aid in cash raises spe-
cial constitutional dangers. See id. at 818-19 ("Of course, we have seen special Estab-
lishment Clause dangers when money is given to religious schools or entities directly
rather than... indirectly." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 844
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he plurality does not actually hold
that its theory extends to direct money payments.").
91 At first, McCallum appears to present an example of excluding religion from a
direct aid program. Under the program, the Wisconsin Department of Corrections
entered into contracts with private halfway houses under which a defined amount
would go to the institution chosen by a supervised offender. McCallum, 179 F. Supp.
2d at 959-62. The trial court ruled that excluding faith-based programs from that aid
program would not violate either the Free Exercise Clause or the Free Speech Clause.
Id. at 978-82. Yet the Wisconsin program differed from a direct aid exclusion in two
ways. First, any exclusion of religious providers would have been mandated by the Es-
tablishment Clause, not adopted as a policy matter. Id. at 978. Second, the Wisconsin
program may not have qualified as direct aid because, although aid did flow uninter-
ruptedly from the state to halfway houses, it did so only following the free choice of
supervised offenders, making it arguably equivalent to a voucher program. McCallum,
324 F.3d at 882 (Posner, J.). But see Mitchel4 530 U.S. at 842-44 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (distinguishing between indirect aid and a per capita direct aid
program). McCallum thus does not evaluate the constitutionality of a policy-based ex-
clusion of religion from a direct aid program.
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private schools other than religious ones.2 Under this Article's pro-
posal, that sort of program could withstand constitutional scrutiny, so
long as it did not violate any of the limits described below.
What about denials of funding to some subset of religious
groups-such as those that engage in disfavored practices? Such
narrow exclusions are quite rare. Although the government does
commonly deny support to organizations that discriminate on the ba-
sis of religion, gender, sexual orientation, and the like,9 4 those sorts of
conditions do not usually target religious entities as such. Instead,
they apply evenhandedly to all groups and therefore do not constitute
exclusions of religion, as that term is being used in this Article.
Still, instances do occasionally arise where the government de-
clines to support certain practices that are engaged in only by some
religious entities. Perhaps the most vigorous controversy surrounding
the Bush administration's policy of promoting equal funding of faith-
based social service organizations has been over whether funded
groups will be able to discriminate on the basis of religion in hiring.
95
92 Cf Mitchell 530 U.S. at 836 (upholding a program that provided educational
materials to all public and private schools).
Could a legislature extend tax exemptions to all nonprofit organizations other
than religious ones? Currently, neutral tax exemptions for nonprofit groups may in-
clude religious organizations, of course. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
680 (1970) (upholding a property tax exemption that included land owned by reli-
gious organizations for religious worship). Barring religious groups from such exemp-
tions would count as an exclusion of religion from a direct aid program, because a tax
exemption is inherently equivalent to a grant, despite the Court's occasional state-
ments to the contrary. See id. at 675 ("The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship
since the government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply ab-
stains from demanding that the church support the state."). No such program has
confronted the courts, to my knowledge, but one well may. If that happens, it may be
argued that singling out religious entities for denial of a tax exemption resonates un-
comfortably with a history of hostility toward religion through taxation. See Comm. for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793 (1973) (characterizing the
Walz tax exemption as a guard against government oppression of religion through
taxation).
93 Cf Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE LJ. 769 (2002) (describing new forms of
discrimination not against entire suspect classes, but only against members of those
classes who engage in certain activities).
94 See Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, No. 04-4484, 2006 WL
997217, at *25 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2006) (upholding Hastings Law School's refusal to
recognize CLS on the ground that it violated a general rule against discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation).
95 Laycock, supra note 14, at 197. The charitable choice provisions that preceded
the Bush administration's faith-based initiatives explicitly preserved the ability of reli-
gious employers to consider faith when hiring. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (2000) (noting
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Currently, an exception to the federal employment discrimination
laws allows religious organizations to take faith into account when se-
lecting employees. 96 So, a decision to deny government contracts to
social service organizations that hire on the basis of faith would only
affect religious organizations and could be seen as an exclusion of re-
ligion. 97 At least as a constitutional matter, then, this Article's ap-
proach would indeed allow policymakers to decline to fund social ser-
vice organizations that discriminate against people of certain faiths in
hiring in some circumstances.9 8 Just as the government may decide
not to fund the exercise of religious liberty generally, so too it may
make a policy choice not to support employment discrimination on
the basis of religion that is only practiced by sectarian organizations.
D. Objections
Even this initial argument is sure to have raised objections. Three
deserve immediate attention: (1) excluding religion constitutes facial
discrimination on the basis of religion, which is presumptively uncon-
stitutional; (2) even if the government need not always observe facial
neutrality as to religion in its support programs, it should avoid favor-
ing religious choices over secular substitutes; and (3) regardless of
what the First Amendment requires, statutory and state constitutional
provisions bar targeted denials of funding.
1. Discrimination on the Basis of Religion
Perhaps the strongest argument against the practice of excluding
religion is simply that the Constitution presumptively prohibits gov-
ernmental discrimination on the basis of religion. After all, the Court
that a religious organization's ability to discriminate on the basis of religion in hiring
"shall not be affected" by participation in a charitable choice program).
96 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (a) (2000) (exempting religious institutions from a fed-
eral law prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of religion).
97 Of course, the policy may be phrased neutrally, but because only religious
groups are permitted to discriminate on the basis of religion under federal law, and
because policymakers can be presumed to be aware of that, exclusion of such groups
from support is properly deemed a targeted exclusion of religion.
98 The exclusion would be prohibited if it amounted to preferentialism on the ba-
sis of sect or ran afoul of any of the other limits set out in Part II. See infra Part III.A
(discussing the nonpreferentialism principle).
99 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532
(1993) ("At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law
at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits
conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons."); EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra
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has said that the antidiscrimination rule applies not only to regulations
but equally to funding.'l° If that principle pertained here, as it would
seem to, then the case against excluding religion might be strong.'01
A first response is that governmental decisions not to subsidize an
autonomy- or liberty-based right are normally not thought to impede
the right's exercise in a way that raises constitutional difficulties. Some-
times that is true even where the relevant fight includes some sort of
equality component. So, for instance, it is permissible for the govern-
ment to fund counseling about childbirth but not about abortion, even
though a regulation that distinguished between the two types of speech
might well constitute viewpoint discrimination and therefore be pre-
sumptively invalid.10 2 The Court has also pointed out that when Con-
gress establishes a program to promote global democracy, it is not also
therefore constitutionally required to encourage "competing lines of
note 18, at 222-27 (concluding that Davey is likely inconsistent with the authors' prin-
ciple of "Equal Liberty," though it may be justifiable on pragmatic grounds); Laycock,
supra note 14, at 199 ("Funding secular programs, but not religious equivalents that
provide the same secular benefit, is rank discrimination ...."); Paulsen, supra note 14,
at 658 (opposing the common practice of "outright discrimination against religious
speakers and groups in terms of... public privileges of various kinds"); see also id. at
662 ("[T]he essential intellectual battle has been won: There is no 'religion excep-
tion' to the Free Speech Clause or the Free Press Clause; religious speakers and groups
are entitled to the same equal access to public fora, public facilities, and public funds
as other private speakers and groups receive." (footnote omitted)); Volokh, supra note
18, at 365-73 (arguing against discrimination on the basis of religion in funding).
There is historical evidence that the Federal Free Exercise Clause was partly di-
rected against discrimination on the basis of religious differences. See Philip Ham-
burger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REv. 835, 854-55 (2004). That evidence, however, does
not necessarily pertain to selective denials of state aid.
100 See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan,J., concurring) (argu-
ing that ministers may not be excluded from office partly because "government may
not use religion as a basis of classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privi-
leges or benefits"); see also Volokh, supra note 18, at 365 (quoting McDaniel and arguing
that "equality rules generally apply to government benefits as well as government pro-
hibitions"); Volokh, supra note 6, at 1936 & n.67 (noting that the government usually
cannot discriminate on the basis of religion in its support so that, for instance, a gov-
ernment hospital that provides secular circumcisions cannot refuse to provide religious
ones, but acknowledging Davey as "the chief exception" to that rule).
lot See Laycock, supra note 14, at 173 (arguing that Joshua Davey's case against
Washington's scholarship program ought to have been "a slam dunk" under Lukumi).
10 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-94 (1991) (reasoning that in selectively
funding counseling concerning childbirth, but not concerning abortion, "the Gov-
ernment has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund
one activity to the exclusion of the other" and that "[t]his is not a case of the Govern-
ment suppressing a dangerous idea, but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its
employees from engaging in activities outside of the project's scope" (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
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political philosophy such as communism and fascism."'' 0 3 Likewise, ex-
cluding religion ought to be understood simply as the government de-
fining the limits of its support programs. 104 One way to think about this
is as a funding exception to the general rule against governmental dis-
crimination on the basis of religion. An implication is that a constitu-
tional democracy has some limited power to influence citizens' choices
regarding commitments of conscience.'15 Religious freedom protects
citizens against government coercion, among other evils, but it does not
necessarily entitle them to facilitation on equal terms.
A second way of answering is to consider that there may be impor-
tant differences between these rights-privacy, speech, and free exer-
cise-and to say that on balance such differences might cut in favor of
a constitutional rule that often allows the democratic branches to ex-
cise religion from aid programs."" Antiestablishment considerations,
again, favor a constitutional approach that is especially tolerant of se-
lective defunding in the area of religion.0 7 The government can with-
hold a subsidy on the basis of religion for good reasons that fall short
of constitutional imperatives but can nevertheless inform policy. For
instance, it may conclude that excluding religion promotes equal citi-
zenship, that it works to prevent excessive division in the citizenry, and
that it protects the conscience of taxpayers.'08 Now, admittedly, Jus-
tice Scalia is correct that a freestanding principle prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of religion-freestanding in the sense that it applies
even in the absence of any burden on religious exercise.'°9 Yet that
guarantee only protects against discrimination on the basis of sect or
denomination in the context of government support programs. And
103 Id. at 194.
104 See id. ("[When the Government appropriates public funds to establish a pro-
gram it is entitled to define the limits of that program.").
105 For more on this issue, see Part L.A and the Conclusion.
106 Some, however, draw a stronger distinction between the two rights than this
Article does. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 14, at 177 ("The right to choose abortion is a
right to be free of undue burdens; the right to religious liberty is a right to government
neutrality.").
107 See supra Part L.A (summarizing the effect of these considerations on policy-
makers).
108 See FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 6 (arguing that Americans are currently deeply
divided by divergent visions of the proper relationship between religion and govern-
ment). But cf Garnett, supra note 36 (arguing that religion's capacity to divide ought
not to exert undue influence in antiestablishment decisions).
109 For instance, a legislature could not pass a resolution declaring "America Is Not
a Muslim Nation," even if the law did not impose any civil or criminal penalties. See
Tebbe, supra note 15, at 727.
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even if it applied to religion as a general category, any special concern
about discrimination on that basis would be overbalanced by antiestab-
lishment commitments that cut in favor of certain exclusions of relig-
ion.
Someone might challenge that judgment, arguing that the com-
mitment to facial neutrality on the basis of religion should trump the
government's ability to provide greater antiestablishment protection
than the Constitution requires. There is room here for fair differ-
ences. But anyone who challenges excluding religion in that way must
not only counter the theoretical arguments above but must also con-
front Davey, which allowed Washington to select religious study for
non-funding exactly because the state wished to pursue a particularly
robust vision of antiestablishment (there set out in the state constitu-
tion). " After all, Justice Scalia's argument in Davey lost by a margin
that was unusually wide for this area of law and is not likely to be re-
duced in the Roberts Court."
2. Noninterference with Private Choice
A more nuanced objection to this Article's position is that exclud-
ing religion is problematic not in all funding contexts, but only where
the government simultaneously supports direct alternatives. That is
110 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 n.2 (2004) (quoting WASH. CONST. art. I,
§ 11).
II Why has the Court not applied equal protection principles to excluding relig-
ion? After all, modern equal protection jurisprudence prohibits discrimination in the
area of funding as well as in regulation, though perhaps not in precisely the same way.
Noticing this, Justice Scalia invoked equal protection cases in his Davey dissent. He
cited them by analogy, arguing that just as no burden need be shown in order to make
out a constitutional violation in other areas of law, so too the indignity of suffering dis-
crimination based on religion ought to suffice. See id. at 731 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (in-
voking Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976)). Perhaps he could have gone further and said that excluding religion violates
the Equal Protection Clause itself.
This Article does not closely interrogate the relationship between religious liberty
and the right to equal protection. It goes only so far as to say that religious freedom is
best understood primarily as a right to autonomy or liberty, not neutrality or equality.
Certainly, rights to free exercise and antiestablishment build in certain independent
neutrality or equality protections for religion, as this Article acknowledges at several
points. But those protections are tailored to specific problems surrounding religious
freedom and should not be reduced to more general equal protection guarantees.
This Article will leave the matter there, since the relationship between religious liberty
and equal protection is an exceedingly complex matter worthy of its own careful
treatment. Thanks to Philip Hamburger for pressing me to address this point.
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the position of Judge Michael McConnell, who is also, of course, a
leading scholar in the area. 11
According to Judge McConnell, a state would not be prevented
from, say, funding math classes at secular private schools but not at re-
ligious ones, because that scheme would skew incentives away from sa-
cred institutions. This Article, by contrast, argues that the govern-
ment may choose to skew private incentives away from religious
entities, subject to certain constraints outlined in Part III. That Part
will take up the math class example in greater detail and show that al-
though there is actually a fair degree of overlap between the results
that would be reached by Judge McConnell's approach and the out-
comes urged by this Article, that particular example presents a point
of real divergence.
For now, the fundamental point is that the question of whether
substitute activities are funded is irrelevant to this Article, which con-
ceptualizes religious freedom primarily as a right to liberty or auton-
omy that is not ordinarily burdened by a governmental decision to se-
lectively deny aid in a way that disincentivizes observance. I will draw
out some further implications of that argument in the Conclusion.
3. RFRA
A final objection may be that limiting this Article's inquiry to con-
stitutional law is too convenient because excluding religion is likely to
run afoul of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and simi-
lar state provisions, regardless of whatever the First Amendment re-
quires. RFRA is a federal statute that provides greater protection for
religious freedom than the Free Exercise Clause does. Congress de-
signed RFRA precisely to restore the doctrine that was in place before
Employment Division v. Smith, which put an end to heightened constitu-
tional scrutiny of laws of general applicability.1 3 RFRA directs courts
to presume that a "substantial[] burden" on observance is unlawful,
112 Judge McConnell has said that "a government program may be unconstitu-
tional if it funds a substitute for a constitutionally protected choice without also funding
the individual's preferred choice," unless the government has a reason for the disparity
that is not "objectively hostile to the right in question." McConnell, supra note 18, at
1046. His rationale seems to be that officials should refrain from attempting to influ-
ence the private exercise of constitutional rights in one direction or another.
113 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1) (2000) (explaining that a purpose of the law is "to
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and to guarantee its application in all cases
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened").
EXCLUDING RELIGION
even if it is imposed by generally applicable laws.1 14 The Act has been
invalidated as to the states, but it remains in effect with respect to the
federal government. 5 Moreover, about twelve states have enacted
statutes similar to RFRA" 6 and roughly a dozen more have construed
their state constitutions to provide similar protection. 
1 7
The objection would proceed like this: Before Smith, religious
practitioners sometimes did win exemptions-not only from general
regulatory prohibitions that incidentally burdened their observance,
but even from general conditions attached to funding programs.118
Practitioners who objected on religious grounds to a funding condi-
tion would sometimes be entitled to receive the benefit without hav-
ing to meet the accompanying condition. That was particularly (and
perhaps exclusively) true in the context of unemployment benefits.
For example, Seventh-Day Adventists were allowed to receive unem-
ployment benefits even though they refused to accept available jobs
that required them to work on Saturdays, as the unemployment rules
seemed to require,"9 and Quakers were relieved of the requirement to
114 The federal RFRA, for example, provides:
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling govern-
mental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I (2000).
115 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533-34 (1997); see also Guam v. Guer-
rero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 2002). A similar law, the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000), pro-
vides analogous protection to religious inmates in federal and state prisons and to reli-
gious people and institutions that face certain land use restrictions.
116 Volokh, supra note 6, at 1950.
117 Id. at 1950 n.116.
118 Id. at 1949.
119 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963). In Smith, Justice Scalia suggested
that the unemployment board in Sherbert discriminated purposefully when it granted
individualized exemptions on secular grounds but refused to do so on religious
grounds. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990); cf Hobbie v. Unem-
ployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 148 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (writing
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accept available work when the open job required them to build mili-
tary weapons in violation of their commitment to pacifism. 20  The
Court's rationale was that groups faced with a choice between violat-
ing a religious tenet and forgoing state funds faced "unmistakable"
pressure to abandon their beliefs.'2 ' In a sense, these decisions did
indeed require the government to subsidize (what was then seen as) a
constitutional right to free exercise.12 They required the government
to provide unemployment benefits to religious actors whom it would
have preferred to exclude.123 And laws like RFRA explicitly revive this
doctrine and purport to apply it generally, beyond the context of un-
employment benefits. 124 Perhaps such laws also prohibit the practice
of excluding religion. 121
that the state "regards [the plaintiff's] religious claims less favorably than other claims"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
120 Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); see also
Frazee v. 11. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (coming to a similar con-
clusion in another unemployment benefits case); Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141 (same). Even
after Smith, and even absent RFRA, the employment benefits rule has remained a
mainstay of free exercise jurisprudence. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (explicitly preserv-
ing the Sherbert line of unemployment benefits cases).
121 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
12 See Volokh, supra note 6, at 1956 ("Under these cases, the government was in-
deed required to subsidize the exercise of what was then seen as a constitutional
right."); id. at 1959 ("Whatever one thinks of the merits of Sherbert, RFRAs do make the
Sherbert reasoning part of the statutory mandate, and under that reasoning the gov-
ernment must sometimes subsidize religious practice.").
13 See id. at 1954-62 (discussing Sherbert and Thomas). One way to avoid the con-
clusion that RFRAs require equal subsidies is to read Sherbert itself as resting not on a
conclusion that the funding condition substantially burdened religious activity, but
rather on the fact that the state there had banned only the practices of minority de-
nominations instead of imposing a religion-neutral condition. Christians who ob-
served the Sabbath on Sunday were not affected by the unemployment policy at issue
in the case because, at the time, Sunday was set aside by law as a day of rest. Even in
times of national emergency, when workers could be required to report for duty on
Sundays, people who observed the Sabbath on that day would be exempt. Sherbert, 374
U.S. at 406. Therefore, there was some evidence that the Sherbert policy discriminated
on the basis of denomination, and not just on the basis of religion. This Article's ar-
gument would prohibit that sort of discrimination among faiths. See infra Part III.A.
124 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000) (affirming explicitly that the law was meant to
restore the rule of Sherbert and the other unemployment benefits decisions). Exclud-
ing religion might be seen as interfering with observance in much the same way-by
denying a benefit. See Laycock, supra note 14, at 177 (articulating a version of this ob-
jection).
125 Whether and how RFRA and its cognates will continue to relieve observant
people from funding conditions is actually a difficult issue. See Volokh, supra note 6, at
1951 ("Should... objecting groups prevail and get the benefits while escaping the
condition? This turns out to be a murky issue .... ."). There is a strong argument that
many such conditions are properly viewed not as "substantial burdens" on free exercise
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Yet RFRA does not, in fact, affect this Article's argument. RFRA
was not designed to address laws that target religion as such-as ex-
clusions of religion do-but instead to relieve religious people from
support conditions that are neutral as to religion but that nevertheless
incidentally burden observance. RFRA's objective was to overrule
Smith, which had changed the rule concerning those sorts of inciden-
tal burdens on observance. The Act was not meant primarily to ad-
dress outright targeting. A condition that requires someone receiving
unemployment benefits to accept available work, for instance, applies
in the same way to everyone.
Now it should be acknowledged that, by its terms, RFRA does ap-
ply to purposeful discrimination as well. To trigger RFRA's presump-
tion of unlawfulness, one would only have to show that selective fund-
ing imposed a substantial burden. RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause
overlap here and it is therefore possible to make conceptual space for
the argument that RFRA provides greater protection against inten-
tional discrimination than the Free Exercise Clause does, just as it
provides special protection against incidental discrimination. How-
ever, that interpretation is not likely to prevail in any court. Everyone
understands that RFRA was primarily directed at incidental burdens
on religion, not purposeful ones. Because Smith did not markedly al-
ter constitutional law surrounding purposeful discrimination, RFRA
has had little effect on that area of doctrine. 16 Courts therefore will
likely conclude that RFRA and its progeny do not provide supraconsti-
tutional protection against purposeful discrimination, including the
deliberate exclusion of religion from support programs. As such,
RFRA-like laws should not alter this Article's analysis of whether exclu-
sions of religion are lawful. 127
within the meaning of RFRA, but instead as mere governmental refusals to fund the
exercise of a constitutional right. See id. at 1957-58. Can it really be said, for instance,
that a state's decision to fund only public schools substantially burdens the constitu-
tional right of parents to send their children to religious schools? See id. at 1958. And
beyond the question of whether a funding condition constitutes a substantial burden,
hard questions remain, such as whether the government's interest in the condition is
compelling, whether the condition is narrowly tailored, and so forth. See id. at 1962-65.
Thus, the objection depends on a series of questionable doctrinal moves.
126 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
546-47 (1993) (striking down Hialeah's ordinance under the Smith test after finding
purposeful discrimination against Santeria adherents).
127 That might raise an awkward possibility. If this Article is correct that purpose-
ful discrimination against religion in government support is permissible in many cir-
cumstances, and if RFRAs do indeed render presumptively unlawful some general
funding conditions, the odd result might be that while incidental burdens imposed by
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So far, this Article has argued that excluding religious practices
from governmental support should not trigger heightened constitu-
tional concern, at least in certain prevalent circumstances. First, that
argument is rooted in theory, both because rights of liberty or auton-
omy are not normally seen as being burdened when the government
selectively funds them, and also because special features of religious
liberty--especially certain antiestablishment concerns-make it par-
ticularly appropriate to leave the decision of whether to fund religious
entities up to elected policymakers. Second, this Article's theoretical
argument is supported by existing free exercise precedent (especially
the logic of Davey) and it resonates with jurisprudence surrounding
other constitutional rights. Citizens' decisions surrounding pregnancy
and parenting, while protected from regulation, may be selectively
funded even though uneven support would have the (intended) effect
of influencing private decision making concerning protected activi-
ties. Up to this point, the argument has been limited to government
support of religious practices. Part II will extend it-in considerably
modified form-to state support of religious expression.
II. EXCLUDING RELIGIOUS SPEECH
Speech sometimes may be subsidized selectively without offending
the Constitution. This Part argues that the government should have
somewhat wider latitude to exclude religious speech from its support
than it currently enjoys. It also identifies areas in which exclusions of
sacred speech are practically achievable under current legal condi-
tions. Exclusion of religious speech may occur in at least two distinct
situations: where the government itself speaks (or pays private parties
to promote its messages), and where it subsidizes private speech. The
general conditions are presumptively unlawful, seemingly more egregious purposeful
denials of funding would not be. Under that scheme, for instance, it is possible to
imagine religious parents arguing that a general denial of funding to private schools
incidentally burdened their rights to supply their children with a religious education.
Yet other parents would have no claim against a law that specifically targeted religious
private schools for denials of funding. This would be an uncomfortable pair of results;
but such awkwardness will virtually never arise in practice because that type of disparity
will simply not occur. Most often, courts will sensibly find that mere denials of support
do not impose substantial burdens on observance and therefore that RFRA's strict
scrutiny test is not triggered. The refusal to extend unemployment benefits in Sherbert
was a rare case, justified by the importance of subsistence support and perhaps other
unique circumstances. Even before Smith, the Court never extended its exception to
any funding condition outside that special context. There is little reason to think that
it will do so under RFRA.
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practice is usually (but not always) unproblematic in the former in-
stance, where the government is promoting its own views, but it is
much more difficult to defend in the latter situation. Where policy-
makers facilitate private speech, theoretical concerns over selectivity
are stronger and the doctrine is troubled. Consequently, courts have
struggled over denials of government support for private religious ex-
pression. Today they face the difficult question of whether public fa-
cilities may refuse to open their doors to worship as such.
A. Government Speech
Of course, the government may be selective when communicating
its own views. That idea is commonly accepted among jurists and
scholars alike. Officials are elected partly because they favor certain
policies over others and wish to promote adoption of those prefer-
ences as official government policy. 121 Private citizens' liberty nor-
mally is not seen to be constricted when officials favor certain ideas or
ideologies over others in their own official speech.
That is true even though government advocacy of certain views
may sometimes be seen as a form of state support of those messages.
Though the analogy is not perfect, official expression can amount to
government support. For example, a town that erected a "Choose
Life" sign on the steps of its municipal building might well be seen to
have provided a form of support for the expressive positions of certain
citizens rather than others. And in Rust, again, the Court upheld a
federal program that only funded private organizations advocating
family planning techniques other than terminating pregnancies.
129
That program required any funding recipient who wished to recom-
mend or encourage abortion to segregate those activities "physically
and financially" from federally funded counseling on pregnancy and
128 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (not-
ing that the government may "say what it wishes" when it promotes particular policies).
For an example of viewpoint discrimination in government speech concerning relig-
ion, see the various resolutions defending the constitutionality of recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance. S. Res. 292, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted); H.R. Res. 459, 107th
Cong. (2002) (enacted).
1 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991); see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833
(reading Rust to involve facts where "the government did not create a program to en-
courage private speech but instead used private speakers to transmit specific informa-
tion pertaining to its own program," and recognizing that "when the government ap-
propriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say
what it wishes").
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childbirth.'30  Subsequent decisions have interpreted Rust's rule to
mean that the government may discriminate among messages when it
promotes its own views."] Rust's holding has also been described as
an instance of the more general principle defended in the last Part-
viz., that the government can carve out even protected activities from
its funding programs. 3 2 The upshot is that government speech some-
times also effectively facilitates private messages, and that even when it
performs this function of subsidizing private standpoints, state expres-
sion may favor some views over others.
3 3
When the government speaks, it likewise may decide to exclude re-
ligious messages. That is true even where the exclusion is not man-
dated by antiestablishment rules. A town that erected a holiday dis-
play on the steps of its municipal building, for instance, surely could
decide to include only secular images. No case has so held, to my
knowledge, but nevertheless the principle seems plain. Similarly, a
courthouse composing visual aids to educate citizens about historical
influences on our nation's laws could decide to exclude images of the
Ten Commandments. It could do so even though the Court has sug-
gested that including the Ten Commandments in such displays will
sometimes be perfectly permissible. 3 4 The locality could decide that
130 Rust, 500 U.S. at 180.
1 See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (interpreting Rust
as an approval of viewpoint discrimination in government speech, although the gov-
ernment in that case delivered its message through private speakers). Of course, that
reading of Rust has been criticized, but this Article follows the Court's view. Cf Mi-
chael C. Doff, Dicta and Article II, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2055 n.212 (1994) (discuss-
ing contexts in which government funding of private speech may not be equated with
government speech, making viewpoint discrimination impermissible).
132 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 193-94 ("The Government can, without violating the Con-
stitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in
the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which
seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing, the Government... has
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.... [W]hen the gov-
ernment appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the
limits of that program.").
133 See Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (2000)
(arguing that government speech may often permissibly endorse contested view-
points).
134 See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 874 (2005) (suggesting in dicta
that certain courtroom displays could include images of the Ten Commandments). A
tougher question is whether Congress could explicitly decline to endorse religion as a
whole-for instance, by issuing a nonbinding resolution stating that "America Is a
Secular Nation." But it is not necessary to take a position on that difficult issue in or-
der to defend simpler exclusions of religious expression from government speech.
The only contention here is that it must be permissible for officials to decide to pro-
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the wisest course would be to avoid disputes over the proper place of
the Decalogue in American public life-and that decision would not be
seen to interfere with the free exercise or speech rights of any citizen.
Omission of religious messages is also permitted when the gov-
ernment pays private actors to transmit its own views. There too, nei-
ther liberty of conscience nor free expression is offended when the
government decides to express only secular viewpoints through pri-
vate mouthpieces. In programs analogous to the one considered in
Rust, Congress has enacted statutes allowing the provision of support
to counseling organizations that promote abstinence as the only ac-
ceptable form of birth control.135 Lawmakers could go further and
specify that participating organizations could only give nonreligious
reasons for preferring abstinence-perhaps because of a policy judg-
ment that religious justifications might alienate some young people or
otherwise backfire. Under existing law, prohibiting funded organiza-
tions from conveying faith-based messages on behalf of the govern-
ment would be seen merely as a decision to address the issue of con-
traception in one way and not another."6 Even if targeting religious
speech were understood to be viewpoint discrimination, the worst
form of state bias concerning speech, it nonetheless would be consid-
ered permissible in the context of government expression. 137
Speech rules like these bolster by analogy the argument in Part I
that religious practices generally may be excised from support pro-
grams without offending the Constitution. Recall that Davey alluded
to these speech rules (without citing them directly). Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote that "[t]he State has merely chosen not to fund a dis-
tinct category of instruction " 138 and that "the exclusion of such fund-
mote only secular positions, even where excluding religious messages is not constitu-
tionally required.
:35 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 710 (2000); id. § 300z.
36 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)
(interpreting Rust to mean that "when the government appropriates public funds to
promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes"); Rust, 500 U.S.
at 194 (rejecting the petitioner's argument that government funding choices reflect
viewpoint discrimination if the government fails to fund organizations on both sides of
an issue).
137 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833-34 ("When the government disburses public
funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and
appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the
grantee. It does not follow, however,... that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper
when the University does not itself speak. . . ." (citation omitted)).
1 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 (2004).
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ing places a relatively minor burden" 13 9 on eligible students. Again,
the unmistakable reference was to Rust, where Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, had reasoned that the government
had "merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other."' 4 Excluding religious speech might well have been found to
be permissible under the logic of cases approving the government's
nonfunding of other speech.
Even critics of Rust-of whom there are, of course, many 141-may
be able to agree that the government should have some discretion to
create programs that promote only nonreligious messages. That is
because excluding religion may further antiestablishment values that
reflect the particular place of religion in American society. Govern-
ment may choose to exclude religious speech, like religious practice, in
order to promote equal citizenship, community harmony, or freedom
of conscience.1 4' Because of these antiestablishment commitments,
which are particular to religious speech, even those who believe that
Rust was wrongly decided may support the ability of the government to
excise supernatural references from its own expression.
The government's power to speak about particular denominations
is circumscribed in ways that I will detail in Part 111.143 For now, it is
enough to say that excluding all religious perspectives from state en-
dorsement generally is constitutional.
B. Private Speech
Even when the government is not propagating its own views, it re-
tains a measure of control over the sorts of private speech it promotes.
Again, a basic principle holds that "when the Government appropri-
ates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the lim-
its of that program."' 44 That idea applies even to programs that aid
139 Id. at 725.
140 Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. Credit for this insight belongs to Douglas Laycock. See
Laycock, supra note 14, at 176 ("With or without citation, Davey's paraphrase of Rust is
unmistakable.").
See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 131, at 2055 (acknowledging critics' disagreement
with Rust); Greene, supra note 133, at 59 (same); David A. Strauss, Principle and Its Per-
ils, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 373, 384 (1997) (reviewing RONALD DwORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw:
THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996)) (agreeing with Profes-
sor Dworkin that Rust was wrongly decided).
142 See supra Part I.A.
143 See infra Part III.A.
144 Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
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private speech, albeit in a modified way. Officials usually can choose
to subsidize only certain types of speech, just as they can selectively
fund rights to abortion and religious practice. Yet because the gov-
ernment enjoys a monopoly on certain fora for speech (the most ob-
vious are streets and sidewalks), its ability to exclude expression there
is necessarily limited. Selective exclusion from paradigmatic public
spaces may look more like silencing than like a refusal to subsidize.
Between these two poles-facilitation of only certain types of speech
on the one hand and selective exclusion from traditional public
spaces on the other-lies an interim territory that is notoriously diffi-
cult to navigate. This Section will first argue, as a matter of theory,
that the political branches ought to have greater ability to exclude re-
ligious speech than is allowed under the Rosenberger line of cases. It
will then identify areas where selective support for religious speech
may be open to policymakers despite those decisions.
Begin by recalling a principle from general speech law: when the
government opens nonpublic property to outside speakers, or other-
wise facilitates a range of private expression, 145 it often may choose the
type of speech that it wishes to encourage, even if that means limiting
access on the basis of content.146 So, for instance, Congress may single
out lobbying organizations for denial of certain tax benefits, although
those benefits remain available to a wide range of other political or-
ganizations.14 Everyone recognizes that this sort of exclusion differ-
entiates on the basis of content (that is, against certain types of mes-
sages). Yet that sort of selectivity, which would be suspect in direct
regulation, is often permissible in aid programs, presumably because
145 Funding speech and opening public property to speakers have been seen as
analogous forms of government support. The Supreme Court, for instance, has
treated the former as equivalent to a public forum. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visi-
tors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (finding that a funding scheme consti-
tutes a forum "more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the
same principles are applicable").
146 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983)
("[O]n government property that has not been made a public forum, not all speech is
equally situated, and the State may draw distinctions which relate to the special pur-
pose for which the property is used."); see also Volokh, supra note 6, at 1924, 1930-31
(providing several additional examples).
Of course, this principle intersects with the much-criticized jurisprudence sur-
rounding "designated public forums," "limited public forums," and "nonpublic fo-
rums"-terms that I avoid in order to circumvent debates that do not directly pertain
to the argument here.
147 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550-51 (1983) (hold-
ing that it was not irrational for Congress to choose to subsidize lobbying by veterans'
groups, but not other charities).
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denying a subsidy does not interfere with the ability of unsubsidized
individuals to convey their messages.
Similarly, the government is under no obligation to extend tax
exemptions to contributions toward electioneering and lobbying, even
when it provides those subsidies to other types of speech and even
though (again) drawing this distinction requires the government to
differentiate between messages on the basis of content.1 48 Legislators
may even prohibit the use of tax-deductible contributions for general
lobbying, while permitting their use for lobbying by veterans' organi-
zations.149 Contributions to political candidates, finally, are not tax-
exempt in the same way as contributions to other speakers. 5 0
Many government programs exclude certain types of private
speech from support in this way. Few would dispute, for instance, that
public universities can decide to recognize only student associations,
refusing to facilitate expression by nonstudent groups, even though
both speech and expressive association are constitutionally pro-
tected.1 5' Likewise, nonobscene pornography can be carved out from
state aid programs, even though it counts as protected expression.1 2
And a President may establish a charitable campaign among federal
employees that limits fundraising to voluntary, tax-exempt, nonprofit
organizations-without including groups that engage in politics or
advocacy. 1
53
Despite these holdings, excluding religion from programs that
support a range of private speech is difficult to achieve today. That is
chiefly due to tension between two long-standing constitutional rules.
148 Volokh, supra note 6, at 1925, 1931 (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358
U.S. 498, 513 (1959)).
149 Regan, 461 U.S. at 548.
150 Volokh, supra note 6, at 1925.
151 Paulsen, supra note 14, at 666 n.32; Volokh, supra note 6, at 1930.
152 See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 201 (2003) (acknowledg-
ing that congressionally mandated Internet filters for public libraries could permissibly
block websites that are neither obscene nor pornographic); see also Laycock, supra note
14, at 178 (citing American Library Ass'n).
153 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 795, 813
(1985). Interestingly here, a President may exclude such groups out of a policy desire
to avoid any appearance of government "favoritism or entanglement" with regard to
particular political positions. Id. at 807. The President can do this even where the en-
tanglement is not constitutionally prohibited, but just undesirable as a matter of wise
governance. In much the same way, we might expect that the government would be
able to seek special protection against the appearance of a religious establishment,
over and above what is required by the First Amendment, by excluding religion from
funding programs.
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On the one hand, there is the principle just described: when policy-
makers set aside funds to facilitate private speech, they may discrimi-
nate on the basis of content, even to implement policy judgments and
to favor certain categories of speech. On the other hand-and this
presents the difficulty-the Court has said that viewpoint discrimina-
tion is generally suspect outside the context of government speech,
and not only when the state is regulating expression, but even when it
is acting as a funder. 15 4 The rule against viewpoint discrimination lim-
its the ability of the government to exclude speech from public fora,
even in situations where it is permissible to define those fora on the
basis of content.
Here we see a difference in the cases between speech and other
autonomy- or liberty-based rights, such as privacy and free exercise.
While such rights generally are not considered impermissibly bur-
dened when welfare-state benefits are not extended to support them,
when it comes to expression there is a deeply rooted suspicion of se-
lectively excising points of view from programs that support a diversity
of private speech. Congress could not, for instance, set up a fund to
support all political campaigns other than those conducted by Green
Party candidates (at least not without some extraordinarily good rea-
son). Excluding them from a general fund would skew private order-
ing in a way that would presumptively violate the Constitution, even
though Green Party politicians would remain every bit as free as they
were before the government program was initiated.
15
Rosenberger stands for the proposition that excluding religious per-
spectives from a public forum may qualify as impermissible viewpoint
discrimination. 156 There, the University of Virginia established a stu-
1 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-32 (1995).
Note that viewpoint discrimination is presumptively impermissible regardless of the
type of forum established. Id. at 829-30. Content discrimination, by contrast, is usually
permitted in some types of fora, but remains suspect in others. Id. Accordingly, a
critical question is whether refusing to support all religious expression amounts to dis-
crimination on the basis of content or viewpoint.
155 The rule against viewpoint discrimination seems less anomalous if it is com-
pared not to excluding all religious practice from state aid, but instead only to exclud-
ing particular sects or denominations. That sort of exclusion is presumptively prohib-
ited, even though it does not burden the excluded sects or denominations. See infta
Part III.A.
156 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46; see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch.,
533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001) (characterizing the selective exclusion of sectarian speakers
from government property as viewpoint discrimination); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993) (same). In two other cases,
the Court invalidated selective exclusions of sectarian speakers from government
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dent activity fund to support a variety of student groups.15 One way it
supported them was by paying the printing costs for student publica-
tions.'5s However, the university denied that printing support to reli-
gious publications, defined as those "promot[ing] or manifest[ing]" a
belief "about a deity or an ultimate reality."' 59  That definition in-
cluded Wide Awake, a magazine that addressed social and religious is-
sues from an evangelical Christian perspective. A divided Court
ruled that the university had established a forum from which it could
not constitutionally exclude Wide Awake. 6 Writing for the five-vote
majority, Justice Kennedy held that excising religious messages from
the student publication program was properly seen as viewpoint dis-
crimination.
1 62
That holding went too far. If freedom of speech, like free exercise
and privacy, is properly conceptualized primarily as a right to liberty
or autonomy, then there are good reasons to think that it will not
normally be infringed by an ordinary funding refusal. Under Vir-
ginia's original program, religious students remained as able to ex-
press their views as they would have been in the absence of any publi-
cation assistance for student groups.16  Therefore, their freedom-
property, but without explicitly invoking the rule against viewpoint discrimination.
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
These earlier cases-Widmar, Lamb's Chapel, and Pinett.-all addressed the ques-
tion of whether supporting sectarian speech was prohibited by the Establishment
Clause. In each case, the government defended the exclusion at issue on the ground
that it could not support religious expression without violating that Clause. Therefore,
none of the cases addressed an exclusion of religion, as this Article is using that term,
because none involved a policy decision to omit religious expression. Nevertheless,
each case held not only that supporting religious speech was constitutionally permissi-
ble, but also that it was constitutionally required under the Speech Clause. So, regard-
less of their antiestablishment holdings, these cases stand for the independent proposi-
tion that excluding sectarian expression from a support program may violate free
speech rules.
157 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824.
58 Id. at 822.
159 Id. at 825.
160 Id. at 827.
161 Id. at 829-30.
162 See id. at 831 ("Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also provides, as it
did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of sub-
jects may be discussed and considered. The prohibited perspective, not the general
subject matter, resulted in the refusal to make third-party payments, for the subjects
discussed were otherwise within the approved category of publications.").
1 Wide Awake could have continued to exist at the university and would still have
had a right to use school facilities. Id. at 823-24. It could have relied on other revenue
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whether religious or expressive-would not have been implicated di-
rectly.'64
Moreover, Virginia may have had perfectly understandable rea-
sons to avoid directing tax funds to religious groups in particular, rea-
sons grounded in a special regard for antiestablishment values.
165
Those rationales might have included a desire to promote equal citi-
zenship, to foster community harmony, or to ensure liberty of con-
science for taxpayers. Disagreement with those justifications ought to
have been addressed to lawmakers, not judges. So, for many of the
same reasons that funding exclusions are permitted with respect to re-
ligious practice, so too Virginia ought to have been able to fashion a
program that supported one protected activity without triggering an
obligation to fund religious expression. 1
66
Justice Souter, joined by three others, dissented in Rosenberger, ar-
guing further that a decision to defund religious publications ought to
be seen as a permissible definition of the boundaries of a nonpublic
forum using content-based criteria rather than prohibited viewpointd .. . . 167
discrimination. Accepting for the moment that the distinction be-
tween viewpoint and content makes theoretical sense-something that168
is far from clear -Justice Souter may have been correct that exclud-
ing religious speech should not always be seen as viewpoint-based. Se-
lectively defunding only Presbyterians (or some other specific sect)
would have been closer to paradigmatic viewpoint discrimination,
sources to print its publication. See id. at 826 (noting that Wide Awake included adver-
tisements in its publication).
164 See supra Part I.A.
165 The university argued that the exclusion was necessary for compliance with the
federal Establishment Clause, an argument that the Supreme Court rejected. See
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46. Nevertheless, Virginia could have argued that it wished
to pursue a stricter vision of antiestablishment than what is required by the federal
Constitution. Apparently the students originally raised such an argument, based on
the Virginia Constitution, but dropped it on appeal. See id, at 827.
1 Allowing officials to excise religious speech from their programs may well lead
to more government support for speech, not less. Faced with the choice between sub-
sidizing all private speech within a certain category, including religious speech, or sup-
porting no speech at all, some government actors at the margins will choose the latter.
See, e.g., Berry v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 646 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) (setting
forth a letter from a government administrator who decided to close an agency con-
ference room to all private speech out of a concern that he would not be able to limit
the types of expression allowed there). That result may unwisely avoid disparate
treatment of religion at the cost of weakening state support for speech generally.
,67 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 895-96 (Souter, J., dissenting).
1 See id. at 831 (acknowledging that "the distinction [between content and view-
point discrimination] is not a precise one").
2008] 1305
1306 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 156:1263
such as excluding only Green Party candidates from campaign financ-
ing. But denying funds to all student publications with a religious
perspective may have aligned more closely with excluding all political
activities regardless of party affiliation, something that the Virginia
program also did without causing any controversy.169
Of course, real safeguards would remain even if excluding reli-
gious speech were not considered to be viewpoint discrimination. For
instance, the rule against limiting expression in traditional public
spaces like streets and sidewalks, which is acknowledged in Part III.E,
would persist. Admittedly, however, distinguishing between programs
from which excluding religion is permissible and those traditional
public spaces from which exclusion is presumptively prohibited may
sometimes be difficult. Extensive welfare-state programs may some-
times alter the baseline of entitlements, so that a funding refusal looks
less like mere denial of a subsidy and more like regulation on the basis
of content. But that difficulty is not specific to religious speech. And,
in any event, Rosenberger itself did not involve that sort of traditional
public space, nor any sort of speech platform wide enough or broad
enough to alter the baseline of speech entitlements. Although the
Court did hold that Virginia had created some sort of forum, 70 noth-
ing turned on that observation because the Court had already charac-
terized the exclusion as viewpoint discrimination,"' which is virtually
always prohibited when it is directed at private speech."' And Vir-
ginia's program could not have constituted a traditional public space,
because that would have made the exclusion of political speech more
controversial than it was. Excluding religious expression likewise
ought to have been acceptable.
How does Rosenberger comport with Davey? This Article contends
that the two cannot be reconciled, and that the tension between them
provides another reason to doubt the wisdom of treating exclusions of
religious speech as presumptively impermissible. Simply put, Rosenber-
ger prohibits the government from subsidizing a range of student ex-
pression other than sectarian speech, while Davey holds that certain
sectarian education need not be funded simply because other types of
169 See id. at 825 (describing the ban on funding "political activities" by student or-
ganizations, a term that was understood to refer to electioneering and lobbying).
170 Id. at 829-30.
171 Id. at 831.
172 See Laycock, supra note 14, at 192 (noting that forum analysis is a "distraction"
in the presence of viewpoint discrimination, which is presumptively prohibited regard-
less of the presence of a forum).
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education receive funds. That is a real tension. Given the resonance
of Davey with other areas of constitutional law, that tension strength-
ens the suspicion that Rosenberger's strong rule against excluding relig-
ion in the speech context is constitutionally anomalous.
It is no answer to say that Rosenberger was a speech case while Davey
was a free exercise decision. After all, postsecondary education, which
was at issue in Davey, has an obvious expressive component. Nor is it
an answer to say, as the Davey Court did, that Washington state did not
create a public forum.13 Again, viewpoint discrimination is presump-
tively prohibited whenever the government supports a range of private
expression, even if no forum is created.1 74 And Washington patently
did set out to encourage a diversity of academic thinking and talking. 75
Despite the contradiction, Rosenberger does not seem vulnerable to
being overruled, considering Justice Kennedy's position and the likely
proclivities of other members of the Roberts Court. Nevertheless,
policymakers may well retain some ability to exclude certain types of
religious speech from government support. The next Section looks at
one area in which that may be the case.17,
173 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 n.3 (2004).
174 Cf Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001) (striking down a
restriction on law-reform suits in a congressional program that paid lawyers to repre-
sent indigent clients, even though no forum was created, although not explicitly call-
ing the government's action viewpoint discrimination); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (suggesting that viewpoint discrimination is imper-
missible in funding, even where no public forum exists); Laycock, supra note 14, at
191-93 (critiquing the Davey Court's attempt to distinguish the public forum cases and
noting that viewpoint discrimination is presumptively prohibited regardless of whether
a forum has been created).
Justice Scalia has suggested that viewpoint discrimination ought to be permitted in
funding programs so long as the government has not created a public forum. See
Finley, 524 U.S. at 596-600 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Without taking a
position on the viability of the distinction between viewpoint and content discrimina-
tion, or the distinction between public fora and other sorts of fora, this Article simply
argues that excluding religious speech normally ought to be constitutionally permissi-
ble, except when religious speakers are barred from traditional public spaces and sub-
ject to the other limits set out in Part III.
175 See Laycock, supra note 14, at 194 (noting that "[t]he scholarships in Davey were
available to all within a very broad category" and calling Davey an example of "funding
(or permitting) nearly all speakers or messages within a broad category and excluding
one or a few").
176 Current law sets out two rules: first, where the state speaks, it is permitted to
choose only secular messages; second, where it supports a wide enough range of pri-
vate utterances, it may not exclude religious viewpoints. Careful readers may have no-
ticed that there is another set of cases in which the government does not itself speak
but also does not subsidize a range of private communication. Instead, in these cases it
seeks to fund only specific viewpoints. Neither Rosenberger nor Davey is such a case,
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C. Excluding Worship
May the government decide not to support worship as such?
Nonlawyers might assume that subsidizing worship is prohibited by
the Establishment Clause, but that is almost certainly not the case. In-
stead, the pressing question today is whether government officials are
required to include worship in programs that otherwise support civic
expression. This Section argues that there may be greater room for
the government to deny aid for worship than is often acknowledged.
Officials may want to deny assistance to worship for a variety of
good policy reasons, even when they otherwise support expressive ac-
tivities by a range of secular and religious community groups.
Whether they may do so under current law will depend on whether
their decision is seen as viewpoint discrimination or merely a way of
since both involve state support of a range of private views, but it is nevertheless worth
pausing to consider the matter.
Imagine, for instance, that a state offered $1000 for the best essay celebrating
American independence. That program did not support government speech, of
course, and it also plainly discriminated on the basis of viewpoint against essays deni-
grating independence. Surely such a program would be constitutional despite that
discrimination. Now imagine a similar contest that excluded religion by awarding
money to the best essay celebrating American secularism. Again, the program would
presumably be upheld, even though it involved discrimination against religious view-
points. (I am grateful to Richard Primus for this hypothetical.)
Aside from the rules already set out, the Court has offered little guidance in this
area. It has held that the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) may award grants to
artists based not only on merit but also "taking into consideration general standards of
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public." Finley,
524 U.S. at 572. Yet it did so only by saying that the NEA program did not necessarily
involve viewpoint discrimination and did not create a public forum. Id. at 582, 586.
Importantly, the Court suggested that viewpoint discrimination would not have been
allowed despite the fact that no forum had been created. Id. at 587.
Similarly, the Court has said that Congress may not pay lawyers to represent indi-
gents and then restrict them from bringing law-reform suits. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542.
The government cannot elect to support normal professional advocacy and then place
a distorting restriction on that speech. Id. at 544. But while it analogized to Rosenber-
ger, the Court stopped short of saying that Congress had supported a diversity of pri-
vate views or discriminated on the basis of viewpoint. Id. at 542.
Until the Court says more, the best sense that can be made of these cases is that they
describe a continuum of support and exclusion: as the range of private speech that the
government is supporting becomes wider, and the focus of any exclusion becomes nar-
rower, it will become more difficult for officials to base the exclusion on viewpoint. Cf
Laycock, supra note 14, at 194. With respect to religious speech, the state may not subsi-
dize a range of private expression and then omit religious perspectives, such as from tra-
ditional public places like streets and sidewalks. But where it narrowly funds secular
speech, so that its program begins to resemble government speech, it may well be able to
omit religious viewpoints, as in the essay contest hypothetical.
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defining the boundaries of a limited public forum based on content.
Government lawyers may argue that religious worship ought to be
considered sui generis rather than a form of expressive activity with
secular analogues-such as community building, moral education, or
socializing. If worship were to be understood that way, as something
other than a viewpoint, then it might well be excludable. This argu-
ment stands some chance of prevailing, though serious obstacles stand
in its way.
1. The Case for Allowing Exclusions of Worship
If worship were deemed to constitute a singular form of expres-
sion, then it might well be excludable from government programs that
support other speech by community groups. The government would
only have to show that content discrimination against religious ser-
vices is "reasonable in light of the [limited] purpose[s] which the fo-
rum at issue serves."1 77 Likely it could pass that test. The state would
maintain that it wished to exclude worship from public property for
good policy reasons-reasons that track the justifications for exclud-
ing religion generally-such as protecting against the creation of dis-
favored classes of citizens, heading off perceived identification of gov-
ernment institutions with a particular church, avoiding community
controversy, protecting taxpayers' freedom of conscience, or vindicat-
ing some other especially strong antiestablishment commitment. 78
The government would still be required by Rosenberger to welcome re-
ligious speech that did relate to the purposes of the program, such as
community building or moral education, but it might be able to excise
worship itself.
Can worship thus be considered a singular form of expression?
One argument for singularity refers to common conceptions and so-
cial meanings."9 Treating it differently, on this view, should be per-
missible simply because most people think of worship as meaningfully
177 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983).
178 See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 104-05 & n.8 (2d
Cir. 2007) (CalabresiJ., concurring) (noting reasonable government justifications for
excluding worship from a school after hours).
179 See, e.g., id. at 103 ("Worship is adoration, not ritual; and any other characteri-
zation of it is profoundly demeaning and false.... What the [Boy] Scouts are doing
and what worshippers do, are categorically different!"); Bronx Household of Faith v.
Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 221 (2d Cir. 1997) (Cabranes,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("[T]here is no real secular analogue to religious 'ser-
vices ....").
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distinct from other types of religious speech. People may believe that
worship is directed toward the supernatural rather than toward other
human beings, for instance.I18 A second argument relies not on the
static meaning of the term, but on the social function that it performs
in a particular context. In the situation here, the term worship, prop-
erly understood, may work to allow the government to protect against
a distinct threat to constitutional values. After all, antiestablishment
concerns with equal citizenship, identification, division, and the like,
may apply differently and with unique force to government involve-
ment with worship itself. The point is not that excluding worship is
required by the Establishment Clause, but only that antiestablishment
considerations may provide reasons to think that officials should be
constitutionally permitted to deny aid to worship as such.181
Imagine, for example, a local school policy that permitted com-
munity groups to use school premises whenever they were not being
used by the school. The policy encouraged various types of expres-
sion, including community building, moral education, and worship
itself. As a practical matter, that arrangement could favor groups that
worshipped on Sundays if school activities happened to be conducted
on weekdays and most Saturdays, leaving only Sundays available for
services. 12 Circumstances like these could lead local officials to worry
that the school would become identified with groups that worship on
Sundays-primarily Christians-so that Muslim and Jewish families
might come to consider themselves members of disfavored classes of
citizens. Also, permitting worship services under such conditions
could sow discord in a manner that allowing all discussion of commu-
nity issues or all moral instruction, including by religious groups,
would not. s1 Worship might be viewed by citizens as dissimilar to
other expression included in the program, and its facilitation could
foster discord in the town.
180 Thanks to Ira C. Lupu for this insight.
181 Cf Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 113 (2001) ("[l]t is not
clear whether a State's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would
justify viewpoint discrimination. We need not, however, confront the issue in this
case .. " (citation omitted)). But see Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 131 (Walker, J., dis-
senting) (rejecting the idea that excluding worship is required by the Establishment
Clause).
182 See, e.g., Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 92 (describing one such school policy).
183 See Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 221 (2d
Cir. 2007) (Cabranes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Unlike religious
'instruction,' there is no real secular analogue to religious 'services' ... ).
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If excluding worship can function socially to protect antiestab-
lishment values in certain local circumstances, then it might make
sense to allow the government to consider worship to be sui generis.
Policymakers would be free to open public doors to community
speech without triggering an obligation to include groups that wished
to use a public building as a church, temple, synagogue, mosque, or
the like. Allowing officials to elect not to subsidize religious worship
itself therefore would comport with the general approach of this Arti-
cle, 184 but that result faces constitutional obstacles-two in particular.
The first obstacle is that carving out worship from state support
necessarily constitutes viewpoint discrimination, not because sacred
adoration itself is not unique-it may well be-but because religious
services always include other activity that does have secular parallels. 8 5
As we have seen, excluding religious standpoints, but not analogous
secular ones, is constitutionally problematic under the Rosenberger line
of cases.1 86  That seems to be true even if a church's version of, say,
moral instruction or community building also includes "quintessen-
tially religious" activity.1s7 Where a group's take on allowable content
184 An assumption here is that worship is inherently religious. In fact, if there were
such a thing as secular worship, and if a policy were to exclude from government sub-
sidization all worship-secular and religious-then that policy would not be an exclu-
sion of religion, as I have been using that term, because it would not single out reli-
gious entities or practices for nonsupport. See Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 104 ("If...
we treat worship as something that can also be secular, then the ... exclusion of reli-
gious... worship is clearly invalid."). Refusing to fund both religious and secular wor-
ship would of course greatly strengthen any such program against constitutional chal-
lenge because it would not involve discrimination on the basis of belief. But because I
find it highly unlikely as a practical matter that any government would deny support
for both religious and secular worship, I do not pursue that possibility here.
185 Cf Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (applying strict scrutiny to an
exclusion of religious groups from a public forum); id. at 269 n.6 (rejecting the dis-
tinction between worship and other forms of religious speech); Bronx Household, 492
F.3d at 123-24 (Walker, J., dissenting) (arguing that the school board's exclusion of
worship is "a form of invidious viewpoint discrimination").
186 For examples of cases in which schools violated religious groups' constitutional
right of access in an unnecessary attempt to satisfy perceived Establishment Clause
mandates, see Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Cent. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993).
187 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111. In Good News Club, the Court invalidated an
exclusion of a group that used school property for live storytelling and prayer, even
though these activities were "quintessentially religious," but without explicitly foreclos-
ing the possibility that an exclusion of actual worship or religious services could survive
a constitutional challenge. See id. ("We disagree that something that is 'quintessentially
religious' or 'decidedly religious in nature' cannot also be characterized properly as
the teaching of morals and character development from a particular viewpoint."); id. at
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is blended with prayer or hymn singing, those sacred activities may
have to be swept into a subsidy program in order to avoid a finding of
viewpoint discrimination. Subsidizing quintessentially religious activ-
ity under such circumstances can be a constitutional requirement.
This first argument goes further and contends that worship always
includes valuable standpoints from which to consider questions of
politics, morality, philosophy, and other subjects discussed by non-
worshipping groups participating in state programs. For adherents of
this view, religious services invariably involve community strengthen-
ing or moral instruction. Leaving out worship alone would be analo-
gous to barring only the Green Party from a program sponsoring po-
litical speech.
The most obvious way to overcome this first obstacle is to demon-
strate (along the lines suggested above) that worship has no secular
analogue, either by arguing that it has a singular social meaning or by
showing that excluding worship performs a unique social function,
protecting antiestablishment values in an inimitable way. Arguing
anything else may even run up against commitments of conscience.
Some religious believers will take offense at the suggestion that wor-
ship can be assimilated to some secular activity or even to another type
of religious expression."8 For them, it is important to insist that wor-
ship is categorically different from other community discourse.
There is also an argument that the Rosenberger line of cases actually
does not speak to the exclusion of worship as such. In each of those
cases, the Court confronted a policy that denied access to a religious
program that did in fact include activity with secular parallels-such as
instruction in morality or discussion of childrearing-not a policy that
excluded worship simpliciter.'s9 If anything, the Justices have explicitly
139 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority could not have characterized the
Good News Club's activities as worship, because "[o]therwise... this case would stand
for the remarkable proposition that any public school opened for civic meetings must
be opened for use as a church, synagogue, or mosque").
'88 See, e.g., Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 103 (Calabresi, J., concurring)
("[H]olding that worship is only an agglomeration of rites would be a judicial finding
on the nature of worship that would not only be grievously wrong, but also deeply in-
sulting to persons of faith. As one such person, I find the notion that worship is the
same as rituals and instruction to be completely at odds with my fundamental be-
liefs.... Worship is adoration, not ritual; and any other characterization of it is both
profoundly demeaning and false.").
189 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111 (characterizing the excluded activity as "the
teaching of morals and character development from a [religious perspective]"); Lamb's
Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393 (reasoning that the exclusion affected religious perspectives on
family issues and childrearing).
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reserved the different question of whether disallowing only worship
would be unconstitutional.'90
A second obstacle is that allowing public schools and libraries to
exclude worship, but not religious expression with more direct secular
analogues, would require officials to draw distinctions between wor-
ship and other types of sectarian expression.' 9' That would be trou-
blesome because defining worship would be at least extraordinarily
difficult and at worst constitutionally perilous. It might entangle state
actors, including judges, in answering a question that resists objective
resolution and about which religious people differ as a matter of con-
science.192 On which side of the line, for example, would a Quaker
meeting fall? What about a Buddhist sangha? Neither need involve
adoration or veneration, but both arguably hold places in their tradi-
tions parallel to Christian church services or Jewish synagogue rites.
The Court has suggested that it may not be competent to administer a
1993distinction between worship and other religious expression.
Perhaps the best response to this second obstacle is that refusing
to allow officials to omit worship might come up against a different re-
ligious conviction, namely the belief that worship is exceptional. 94
190 Good News Club assessed facts that came closest to a pure exclusion of religion,
but the Court there also specifically declined to decide whether a denial of access for
worship itself would be constitutional. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112 n.4 (noting
that the activities at issue in the case were not "mere religious worship, divorced from any
teaching of moral values"); see also Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 130 (Walker, J., dissent-
ing) (voting to strike down an exclusion of worship from public property but recognizing
that the Good News Club Court explicitly "declined to reach the question presented in this
case," namely, whether excluding only worship itself offends the First Amendment).
101 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6 (1981) ("It is highly doubtful
that [the distinction between worship and other sorts of religious speech] would lie
within the judicial competence to administer. Merely to draw the distinction would
require the university-and ultimately the courts-to inquire into the significance of
words and practices to different religious faiths, and in varying circumstances by the
same faith. Such inquiries would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in
a manner forbidden by our cases." (citation omitted)); Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic
Ministries v. Clover, 480 F.3d 891, 911 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that it would not be
proper for the court to distinguish between worship and other forms of religious
speech, but nevertheless upholding an exclusion of worship on the ground that private
religious groups themselves had differentiated between worship and their other activi-
ties), cert. denied, 128 U.S. 143 (2007).
192 See Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 129-30 (Walker, J., dissenting) (noting that al-
lowing officials to define worship would give them unduly wide latitude and thatjudges
lack competence to offer a legal definition of the term).
193 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 n.6 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668
(1970)).
194 See Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 103 (Calabresi,J., concurring).
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That belief could be offended by a constitutional rule grounded in
the view that worship is analogous to certain forms of secular expres-
sion. So, arguments based on an interest in avoiding entanglement
with religious convictions may stand in equipoise.
In sum, then, it is possible (though not easy) to make a case that
government programs supporting a range of private speech ought to
be able to selectively defund worship as such. Behind that argument
lies a basic intuition: it is difficult to imagine that policymakers who
choose to open public property to community or civic organizations
are constitutionally compelled to permit sectarian organizations to use
that property as a church, temple, synagogue, or mosque. 195 Officials
may have greater discretion than is commonly thought to protect
against identification of schools and libraries with particular denomi-
nations, to avoid community division over official facilitation of reli-
gious services, and to prevent citizens from feeling disfavored by a
state that, as a practical matter, sponsors the services of a particular sect.
2. Lower Court Debates
Federal appellate judges have differed on the question of whether
excluding worship is impermissible viewpoint discrimination. That
split, which may draw the attention of the Supreme Court, is worth
examining briefly-particularly because the outcomes have often de-
pended on fact-specific determinations, such as whether the excluded
activity consisted of worship alone, and partly because they articulate
differing conceptions of how worship should be understood by courts.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that church services could be denied
support, but it did so over the strong objection of a minority of active
judges on the full court. 196 The dispute arose when Contra Costa
County decided to open meeting rooms located in public libraries to a
variety of civic organizations for "meetings, programs, or activities of
educational, cultural or community interest."197 The county barred
use of its library facilities for two purposes: instruction by schools and
195 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 139 (Souter,J., dissenting) (arguing that the ma-
jority was compelled to conclude that the activity at issue did not constitute a church
service, for "[o]therwise... this case would stand for the remarkable proposition that
any public school opened for civic meetings must be opened for use as a church, syna-
gogue, or mosque").
C96 Glover, 480 F.3d at 895-902 (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
197 Id. at 902.
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"religious services." 98 Faith Center Church Evangelistic Ministries
sued when it was prohibited from using the library meeting room for
what it described as a "praise and worship" service.'99 No one disputed
that Faith Center could hold a "wordshop" that did not involve ex-
plicit worship, despite the fact that it included prayer instruction and
an "End-time call to Prayer for every Believer."2 0 0 The close question
was whether Faith Center's worship service itself could be excluded.
The court ruled that the county could constitutionally ban Faith
Center's worship service from its library facility. "We see nothing
wrong," the court said, "with the County excluding certain subject
matter or activities that it deems inconsistent with the forum's pur-
pose, so long as the County does not discriminate against a speaker's
viewpoint.",2 0  Of course, that begged the really difficult question of
whether worship constituted a subject matter rather than a viewpoint.
Worship, the court concluded, falls into the former category. It took
comfort from the passage in Good News Club noted above,02 where the
Supreme Court reserved the question of whether a polity could ex-
clude "mere religious worship" from a limited forum.203
Two difficulties were raised by Judge Bybee in an opinion for
seven judges dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc. First,
worship of virtually every type will inevitably include just the sort of
community activity that the county set out to encourage. Judge Bybee
recalled that even "quintessentially religious" speech must be included
in a forum when it blends with types of speech that are otherwise sub-
204sidized. Because religious services will always include expression
analogous to permissible speech by secular civic organizations, singu-
lar aspects of worship must be allowed access to public facilities on
equal terms. Second, if courts were to permit the government to ex-
198 Id. at 903.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 904.
201 Id. at 910.
202 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
2C3 Glover, 480 F.3d at 913 (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112 n.4).
204 Id. at 898 (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (quoting
Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111); see also Glover, 480 F.3d at 901 ("Here, the County has
opened its library meeting rooms generally to community groups for a wide range of
cultural and community activities; the distinction between 'mere religious worship'
and other forms of religious speech is thus utterly irrelevant. Whatever 'mere religious
worship' involves, it is both a cultural and a community activity and as such certainly
constitutes an 'otherwise permissible subject[]' under the County's policy." (alteration
and emphasis in original) (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112)).
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clude worship, but not other sacred speech, that rule again would put
officials, and ultimately judges, in the constitutionally untenable posi-
205
tion of having to differentiate among types of religious expression.
Such a rule would also likely favor sects that tend to include moral
teaching or community building in their services over those that are
liturgically oriented.2 0 6
In 2003, by contrast, the Second Circuit struck down an exclusion
of worship, but it did so under significantly different facts. A New
York City Department of Education allowed school facilities to be used
after hours for civic meetings, socializing, recreation, entertainment,
and other activities "pertaining to the welfare of the community"-
even including the discussion of "religious material or material which
contains a religious viewpoint"-but it disallowed their use for "reli-
gious services or religious instruction." "' An evangelical church, the
Bronx Household of Faith, sued when the board refused to let it use
school space to conduct what amounted to a worship service each
Sunday.0 8 The Second Circuit ruled that excluding Bronx Household
from school premises would constitute viewpoint discrimination be-
cause its practices blended actual worship with a type of morality in-
209
struction analogous to that allowed to secular groups. Under Good
News Club, exclusion of "religious instruction" had to be seen as view-. .. . . . 210
point discrimination. The court bracketed the narrower question of
205 Compare Glover, 480 F.3d at 899 (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc) (noting that the distinction between worship and other types of religious
speech "is not 'within the judicial competence to administer"' (quoting Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6 (1981))), with Glover, 480 F.3d at 918 (majority opinion)
(noting that the distinction between worship and "virtually all other forms of religious
speech" is one that "courts are not competent to make," but that the Faith Center itself
had drawn such a distinction in this case). But see Widmar, 454 U.S. at 284-86 (White,
J., dissenting) ("Although... the line may be difficult to draw in many cases, surely the
majority cannot seriously suggest that no line may ever be drawn.").
Glover, 480 F.3d at 901.
207 Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 331 F.3d 342, 348 (2d Cir. 2003)
(emphasis added).
208 Id. at 347.
209 Id. at 354. The Second Circuit had previously upheld a similar policy against a
challenge by the same religious organization. See Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty.
Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 214-15 (2d Cir. 1997). In 2003, the court instead up-
held the policy on the ground that the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Good
News Club had effectively overturned its previous ruling. Bronx Household, 331 F.3d at 355.
210 The Ninth Circuit tried to distinguish Bronx Household on the ground that the
religious practices there had involved a blend of worship and moral instruction,
whereas the Faith Center had engaged in pure worship. Glover, 480 F.3d at 916. My
sense is that this is a difficult line to defend because a great deal of worship includes
activities with secular analogues, such as instruction in morality.
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whether it could, in some future case, allow the Board of Education to
treat religious worship itself-apart from religious instruction-"as an
inherently distinct type of activity" that could be excluded from a fo-
211
rum.
In 2007, the Second Circuit considered that narrower question.
Bronx Household had again been denied permission to use a New
York City school for church services, this time under a newly an-
nounced policy that excluded not all "religious services or religious
instruction," but only groups that wished to use the school for the
purpose of "holding religious worship services, or otherwise using the
school as a house of worship. 212 A panel ruled for the city in a di-
vided opinion that produced no controlling rationale. Judge
Calabresi voted to uphold the exclusion on the merits. To his mind,
worship is a distinct category of expression-it is "adoration," not• • • 213
mere ritual or community-building. Moreover, Bronx Household
itself seemed to recognize that what it was doing differed significantly
from a civic meeting or even a Bible study session, since in the words
of its pastor, "[t]he Bible study club would not administer the sacra-
ments of baptism and the Lord's supper. That would be a big differ-
ence."' Because worship is categorically different from other expres-
sive activities, and because Bronx Household conceded that it was
engaged in worship, Judge Calabresi concluded that its worship ser-
vices could be excluded.
Judge Walker disagreed. Also reaching the merits, he reasoned
that a central purpose of the forum, to foster community in the
neighborhood, would be served by Bronx Household's proposed215
use. Because that use fit the purpose of the forum, Judge Walker
scrutinized the government's motives closely and concluded that the
school board had set out to excise a particular viewpoint from its sub-
216sidy program. He also warned that allowing the exclusion would ei-
211 Bronx Household, 331 F.3d at 355.
212 Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 92, 94 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Calabresi, J., concurring).
213 Id. at 103.
214 See id. (quoting the testimony of Rev. Robert Hall, pastor of Bronx Household
Community of Faith); see also id. at 101 ("In applying for a permit to use school facili-
ties, Bronx Household's pastor described the proposed activities with three words:
'Christian worship service."').
215 Id. at 126 (WalkerJ., dissenting).
216 See id. at 126-27 ("The Board's avowed purpose in enforcing the regulation in
this case, and its long-standing hostility to religious groups, leads ineluctably to the
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ther involve the judiciary in defining worship, a task beyond its com-
petence, or would delegate that job to the school board, which would
then be required to interpret religious doctrine.2 7 Judge Leval re-
solved the outcome-but not the substantive dispute-by voting for
the school board, albeit on the ground that Bronx Household's chal-
2181lenge was not ripe.
In sum, the prospect of excluding religious expression is particu-
larly difficult when the government is otherwise promoting a range of
private speech. That situation triggers constitutional rules that differ
from those involving state support for private religious practices, dis-
cussed in Part I, and government speech, discussed in Part II.A. Here,
by contrast, officials may have to observe a special prohibition on
viewpoint discrimination that has been interpreted-seemingly defini-
tively-to prohibit exclusion of religious perspectives from even lim-
ited fora. This Part has argued that the government ought to be able
to decline to support religious speech more easily than is possible un-
der Rosenberger. Yet even taking Rosenberger as given, there may be
some room for the government to decline to aid religious messages.
In particular, officials might possibly be able to exclude worship even
when they open public facilities to civic speech, and even to other
forms of sectarian expression.
III. LIMITS
Of course, the state's ability to exclude religion is not absolute.
This Part describes five limits, each of which articulates a clear rule
that can be administered without excessive judicial discretion.2 1 9 First,
nonpreferentialism among faiths remains an important constraint,
even in the context of funding. Second, unconstitutional conditions
are prohibited here, as elsewhere in constitutional law. Third, refusals
to subsidize may not be attributable to antireligious animus, a term
that this Part defines carefully. The remaining constraints apply spe-
cifically to the exclusion of religious speech. Fourth, as we have seen,
viewpoint discrimination remains suspect as a practical matter, in fund-
conclusion that the Board, in fact, has undertaken to exclude a particular viewpoint
from its property." (citation omitted)).
217 Id. at 129, 131.
218 Id. at 91 (Leval,J., concurring).
219 For arguments against judicial balancing in the free exercise context, see Jus-
tice Scalia's majority opinion in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-90
(1990), in which he argues that personal religious belief is inherently incompatible
with a balancing test.
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ing cases just as in cases of direct regulation. Fifth and finally, religious
speech cannot normally be excluded from a traditional public forum.
A. Nonpreferentialism
A basic principle of religious freedom holds that officials may not
differentiate among particular sects without an exceedingly strongjus-• • 220
tification. Nonpreferentialism is bedrock constitutional law, longr. • • • 221
considered a basic feature of Americanjurisprudence. It can bejus-
tified in various ways, such as by arguing that allowing the government
to draw theological distinctions among groups would cause regretta-
ble damage to the rule of law (understood chiefly as a rule against ar-
bitrariness), or by saying that it promotes equal citizenship regardless
222of religious identity. However rationalized, the rule against de-
nominational preferentialism is an uncontroverted feature of the
American conception of religious freedom. Moreover, it applies not
only in the context of direct regulation, but also when it comes to
funding and speech.
220 See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244, 246 (1982) ("The clearest command of
the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially pre-
ferred over another."); see also Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989) (sug-
gesting that policies that "facially differentiate[] among religions" are presumptively
unconstitutional); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (disapproving differ-
ential treatment of theistic and nontheistic religions). One reading of a famous pas-
sage from Everson v. Board of Education supports the proposition that the government
may not discriminate among religious groups, even in funding:
New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own relig-
ion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mo-
hammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the
members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving
the benefits of public welfare legislation.
330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (emphasis omitted). That same passage has been cited byJustice
Scalia for a broader proposition, namely that believers generally cannot be excluded
from a state funding scheme. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 726-27 (2004) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Regardless of whether that broader reading is correct, there is little
doubt that, at a minimum, the Everson Court would have disallowed denominational
preferentialism in funding.
221 Nonpreferentialism has deep historical roots. At least some state constitutions
have included prohibitions on laws that discriminated or imposed penalties on the ba-
sis of religious differences. See Hamburger, supra note 99, at 851 (noting the existence
of such provisions in previous versions of the New York and Massachusetts Constitu-
tions). The federal Free Exercise Clause was also likely understood as guaranteeing
freedom from discrimination or penalty, though it may also have prohibited discrimi-
nation on the basis of religion generally. Id. at 855 n.61.
See, e.g., Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 33, at 601 (endorsing an equal citizen-
ship component of religious liberty).
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1. In Funding
Preferentialism is constitutionally problematic even though it may
not burden the exercise of religious liberty. In that sense, nonprefer-
entialism imposes a requirement of evenhandedness that is freestand-
ing of liberty or autonomy considerations.
First consider situations where denominational discrimination
does impose a burden and is obviously problematic. In Lukumi, the
Court struck down ordinances that effectively banned animal killings
only by practitioners of Santeria, even though the town likely could
have banned animal killing altogether for neutral reasons of health
and safety. 22 Or recall Larson v. Valente, where the Court struck down
a religious gerrymander that manipulated state requirements for
224charitable solicitations in order to exclude the Unification Church.
Regulations like the ones struck down in these cases discriminate in a
way that also burdens religious practices.
When it comes to funding, in contrast to regulation, excising a
particular sect may leave members of that group just as free to observe
their faith as they would have been absent the support program.
Imagine, for instance, a hypothetical version of Davey in which Wash-
ington state excluded from the Promise Scholarship not all those ma-
joring in devotional theology but only Presbyterians orJews. Members
of those groups would not be significantly burdened by that exclusion
for precisely the same reasons that Davey himself was found not to• • 225
have suffered an undue restriction of his religious freedom. Merely
withholding scholarship aid would leave Presbyterian or Jewish stu-
dents just as able to pursue their beliefs as they were before the pro-
gram was enacted.
Nonetheless, sectarian preferentialism is as odious in funding
schemes as it is in regulations. Even if specific sects are not burdened
by government decisions to eliminate them from support, they never-
theless cannot be selectively defunded. Again, that sort of exclusion
would violate a basic constitutional prohibition.
23 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535
(1993).
224 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696
(1994) (noting that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from "favor-
ing... one religion over others").
225 See Davey, 540 U.S. at 720-25 (finding that Davey had not been severely re-
stricted in the observance of his faith).
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What if a funding exclusion applies not to a particular sect, but in-
stead to a specific sort of religious practice? Could such an exclusion
be more permissible than outright preferentialism if it furthered a le-
gitimate policy objective? Take, for instance, a recent decision up-
holding the State of Colorado's ban on providing tuition-assistance
funds to any educational institution that was "pervasively sectarian" or
,,226"theological. A Christian college had argued that the exclusion
impermissibly discriminated on the basis of denomination, since not
all faiths feel religiously compelled to establish colleges and universi-
ties that are pervasively sectarian. 1 7 Nevertheless, the district court
128upheld the program. If that outcome is justifiable, it would be be-
cause Colorado's reasons for not funding pervasively sectarian univer-
sities were consonant with the reasons that would drive any govern-
ment to defund religious institutions generally (to further a
particularly robust vision of antiestablishment, to promote unity
among the citizenry, and so forth). Whatever the proper outcome in
the Colorado case, surely it is possible to imagine instances in which
government decisions not to fund particular practices will amount to
discrimination on the basis of denomination. A tuition assistance
program that denied participation only to universities that instructed
students in administration of the Eucharist, for instance, would violate
nonpreferentialism.
2. In Speech
Differentiation on the basis of sect is suspect not only in regulation
and funding, but also when it appears in government speech. As shown
above, the government is free under current law to decide not to pro-
mote religion when it speaks (or pays others to further its views).
229
Government must be able to convey a secular message if it wishes. So,
226 Colo. Christian Univ. v. Baker, No. 04-2512, 2007 WL 1489801, at *1 (D. Colo.
May 18, 2007).
227 Id. at *13. Of course, the exclusion could instead be understood simply as a
refusal to fund education that would be unavoidably religious, regardless of denomina-
tion.
228 Following Larson, the court applied strict scrutiny to the claim of religious pref-
erentialism. See id. ("Colorado's tuition assistance programs similarly [i.e., like the pro-
gram in Larson] differentiate among sectarian institutions.... In such situations, Lar-
son directs that the Court analyze CCU's Establishment Clause claim by applying the
strict scrutiny test."). Nevertheless, the court found that Colorado had a compelling
interest under the Colorado constitution in not aiding pervasively religious institu-
tions. Id. at *14.
2 See supra Part II.A.
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again, a school could set out only secular holiday images-reindeer,
candy canes, Santa Claus-without including any sacred symbols.
This subsection adds an important limit: although the govern-
ment can display a wide range of secular and sacred holiday symbols
230without offending the Constitution, it cannot explicitly exclude only
those of a particular religion or denomination. And, of course, that
sort of discrimination is equally suspect where the government sup-. 1 231
ports private speech.
Preferentialism in government speech was an issue in the Second
Circuit's decision in Skoros v. City of New York.232 There, the New York
City Department of Education had developed a holiday display policy
under which schools were directed to display a Chanukah menorah
and a Muslim star and crescent, along with various secular symbols,
but not a creche or other unambiguously Christian symbols. When a
Roman Catholic parent sued, the court upheld the policy on the
ground that a reasonable observer would not have understood the
displays to be unconstitutional endorsements of religion.2 3  But that
ruling missed the salient point, namely that singling out a particular
faith for exclusion violates a basic principle against discrimination
234among religions, a principle that applies even to government speech.
B. Unconstitutional Conditions
A second limit on the government's power to exclude religion
from support is the rule against unconstitutional conditions. Al-
though the state has no obligation to subsidize the exercise of certain
rights, it nevertheless may not deny other benefits solely because a
230 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 620-21 (1989) (allowing the city
to display a Christmas tree and Chanukah menorah).
211 Cf Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1052-55 (10th Cir. 2007)
(holding that a city that allowed a private group to display the Ten Commandments in
a city park could not exclude display of the symbols of a minority religion-albeit arriv-
ing at that result using forum analysis under the Speech Clause), cert. granted, 76
U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2008) (No. 07-665).
232 437 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2006).
233 Id. at 32.
24 Cf id. at 52 (Straub, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he rea-
sonable parent observer would understand the inclusion of religious symbols of the
Jewish holiday of Chanukah and the Muslim commemoration of Ramadan, and exclu-
sion of any religious symbols of the Christian holiday of Christmas, to convey the
State's approval ofJudaism and Islam and disapproval of Christianity. The touchstone
of the Establishment Clause, its principle of neutrality, forbids such favoritism.").
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135private actor chooses to exercise those rights using private funds.
Put differently, the government may choose not to aid a protected ac-
tivity but it may not deny aid to an entity solely because it engages in
that activity using its own resources. So, for instance, while Congress
may refuse to fund abortions, it may not deny other Medicaid benefits
to women who choose to have abortions using private funds. 1 6 And
though the government may refuse to subsidize lobbying, it may not
deny tax exemptions to nonprofit organizations simply because they
lobby using their own funds. 37 With respect to religious freedom, of-
ficials may not penalize people who engage in observance by with-
holding other government benefits. So, for instance, a state could not
deny prescription drug benefits to theology teachers, even though it
could supplement the salaries of all teachers except those who taught
from a faith perspective.2 3' Excluding observance itself from funding
programs remains constitutional.
The ban on unconstitutional conditions imposes a real constraint
on the state's ability to omit religion from support programs. Imag-
ine, for example, a government office tasked with awarding contracts
to social service organizations that meet certain qualifications con-
cerning effectiveness, safety, and the like. Assume further that one of
those organizations is religious and also conducts worship services.
Those services take place in a different location, are funded sepa-
rately, and do not affect the organization's social service operation,
which is otherwise qualified. The government office could not deny a
235 See Laycock, supra note 14, at 175 ("The Court... says that the government
cannot respond to an exercise of a constitutional right by withholding money for other
activities eligible for government funding.... ."); Volokh, supra note 6, at 1942 ("The
Court has routinely distinguished limits on how government assets are used from limits
on... what other behavior the user engages in with its own assets .... Thus, the gov-
ernment may choose not to subsidize abortions, but it may not deny food stamps to all
women who have had abortions.. ").
236 Nor may a state withhold all benefits to broadcasters that engage in editorializ-
ing. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984).
237 Compare Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (disallowing tax
deductions on lobbying as a business expense), with Regan v. Taxation with Represen-
tation, 461 U.S. 540, 551 (1983) (allowing Congress to require nonprofit organizations
to separate out unfunded lobbying activities from other supported activities).
m Cf Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 734 (2004) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (offering a
similar hypothetical); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 n.8 (1977) ("If Connecticut de-
nied general welfare benefits to all women who had obtained abortions, ... strict scru-
tiny might be appropriate....").
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contract to that organization simply because it also engaged in wor-
239ship in a separate program.
Might the prohibition on unconstitutional conditions defeat a
voucher program that excluded sectarian schools? The argument
would run like this: Religious schools have two components, a secular
educational component that is equivalent to the pedagogy of nonreli-
gious private schools, and a religious component that consists not only
of observance, but also of religiously inflected instruction in subjects
like theology and ecclesiastical history. When a state decides not to
allow religious schools to participate in a voucher program, it is doing
two things, one permissible and the other not. First, the state is de-
clining to fund worship and theological education. That is best
viewed as a permissible decision not to subsidize either free exercise
or the right of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their• 240
children. But, in addition, the state is denying support to the secu-
lar component of the school's educational program. That second ex-
clusion constitutes an unconstitutional condition, on this view.
Judge McConnell made a similar argument in an early article,
written when most exclusions of religion from government support
were still constitutionally mandated. 4 ' He asked readers to imagine
that the secular aspects of a parochial school education cost $4000 per
pupil each year and that the religious parts cost an additional $500.242
No one would dispute that it would be proper for the state to refuse to
fund the incremental cost of the religious component of the school's
educational activities (here, $500) . 2  But Judge McConnell argued
that it would be improper to deny the $4000 for the secular compo-
nents as well, because that would simply penalize families who had de-
239 Here I agree with Judge McConnell's argument against the constitutionality of
denying grants for the provision of secular public services to organizations simply be-
cause they also pursue religious activities. See McConnell, supra note 18, at 1027-28
("[T]he suggestion that religious organizations must categorically be barred from par-
ticipation in all government-funded programs must be rejected.... [D]enying federal
money for activities that would otherwise be funded would amount to a substantial
penalty for exercising one's constitutional rights.").
240 The Court recognized the latter right in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925).
241 McConnell, supra note 18, at 1017-19.
242 Id. at 1018.
243 Id.
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cided to exercise their constitutional right to educate their children in
matters like theology and church history.
2 44
His argument drew on FCC v. League of Women Voters, which struck
down a statute prohibiting public television stations that received fed-
eral funds from engaging in editorializing.4 ' Though it would have
been fine for Congress to defund editorializing, the Court held that
Congress could not also refuse to support the station's other activities.
Otherwise, even stations that wished to express their opinions using
their own funds could not do so without forfeiting all federal support.
Forcing them to choose between exercising their constitutional rights
and receiving other funding would violate the Constitution. 246 Simi-
larly, McConnell's argument ran, states should not be able to deny
funding to the secular aspects of education just because schools
247choose to provide religious aspects using their own funds.
If that position were to prevail, it would defeat the ability of states
to exclude religious practices from perhaps their most important pro-
grams: those that educate children. And that would restrict the scope
and importance of this Article's proposal.
Yet the Court is not likely to be persuaded to view an exclusion of
religious schools from a voucher program as an unconstitutional con-
dition. Religious education often is not easily separable into secular
and sacred components in practice. Many religious groups establish
their own schools precisely because they do not think that merely
supplementing public school education with after-hours religious
education is sufficient. They feel that sacred commitments ought to
pervade all aspects of their pedagogy. 24  Even if religious content
244 Id. at 1018, 1047. Professor Laycock has recently endorsed much the same
view. See Laycock, supra note 14, at 187 ("Refusing state funding for math and reading,
because the school also teaches religion, is clearly a penalty on teaching religion and
on attending a school that does so. If religious liberty consists of minimizing govern-
ment influence on religious choices, such a penalty restricts religious liberty."). (As I
will explain, however, Laycock realizes that Davey poses a significant obstacle to this
view of secular-only voucher programs.) And Professor Paulsen likewise seems to sug-
gest that not allowing religious schools to participate in a voucher program would con-
stitute an unconstitutional condition. See Paulsen, supra note 14, at 667, 710-17.
245 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984).
246 Id.
247 See Laycock, supra note 14, at 179-81 (discussing the divisibility of federal funds
in League of Women Voters and Davey); McConnell, supra note 18, at 1017-19.
248 See Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 379 (1985) (noting the posi-
tion of certain religious schools that "it is not sufficient that the teachings of Christian-
ity be a separate subject in the curriculum, but the Word of God must be an all-
pervading force in the educational program" (emphasis omitted)), overruled by Agostini
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could be excised from classes in history and math, the religious iden-
tity of the school, expressed in mottos and symbols, could still legiti-
mately be seen to color the entire educational experience. Elected
policymakers ought to have discretion over whether to fund schools
that deliver education in such a context.
Current jurisprudence seems to grant lawmakers discretion to re-
quire that unfunded activities be institutionally segregated from
funded ones, specifically in the context of schooling. That discretion
allows them to selectively deny aid to religious components even when
blended with secular ones. The Davey Court had a perfect opportu-
nity to view an exclusion of religious education from support as an
unconstitutional condition. After all, Joshua Davey had declared a
dual major in business administration and devotional theology. It
would have been easy for the Court to hold that disallowing Davey
from applying a portion of the Promise Scholarship to his business
major simply because he also was preparing for the ministry consti-
tuted an impermissible penalty on his rights of free exercise and freeS249
speech. Yet the Court seemed to reject that argument. It reasoned
that Washington had not required students to choose between exer-
cising religious freedom and accepting the scholarship.250 Under the
program's rules, Davey could have accepted the scholarship for his
business major at one university so long as he pursued his clerical
training at another school. 25' Thus, Davey could be required to sepa-
rate out the secular and sacred components of his education. That
252made Davey less like League of Women Voters, where the government
impermissibly denied funding to all of a broadcaster's activities simply
because it engaged in editorializing, and more like Taxation with Repre-
sentation, where the government permissibly required nonprofit organi-
zations to institutionally separate subsidized activities from unsubsidized
251lobbying. Some such analogy to the unconstitutional conditions cases
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997); McConnell, supra note 18, at 1019 ("[O]ne of the
key purposes of religious primary and secondary schools is integrating religion into the
regular curriculum.").
249 See Laycock, supra note 14, at 180 ("[Davey] was indeed required to choose be-
tween his religious beliefs and a government benefit for his secular courses.").
250 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720-21 (2004).
251 See id. at 721 n.4 ("Promise Scholars may still use their scholarship to pursue a
secular degree at a different institution from where they are studying devotional theol-
ogy.").
252 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984).
253 Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 551 (1983).
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remained unarticulated but unmistakable in Davey.2' The Court im-
plicitly compared Davey to those cases and concluded that "[t]he State
has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction."
2 5
5
Accordingly, lower courts ruling after Davey have refused to view
exclusions of religious schools from voucher programs as unconstitu-
tional conditions. Most recently, Maine's highest court figured that
the state's "decision not to extend tuition funding to religious
schools.., does not require residents to forgo religious convictions in
order to receive the benefit offered by the state-a secular educa-
tion.,,256 Students who wished to benefit from a government-funded
secular component to their education could attend a public school or
a nonreligious private school. They remained free to use their own
funds to receive a religious education elsewhere. That way of thinking
brought exclusions from voucher programs into line with Taxation
with Representation and other cases permitting the government to re-
quire citizens to segregate funded and unfunded activities. If families
found that segregation unsatisfying, it may have been due to their be-
lief that religious thinking should pervade all aspects of education.
Maine's choice not to fund that sort of inextricably religious instruc-
tion constituted selective funding, not a penalty on the exercise of a
constitutional right.
C. Animus
There is another limit to the ways in which the government may
exclude religious persons or practices from state support. It may not
engage in exclusions that appear to be driven by simple animus
against religion.
By definition, excluding religion always involves differentiation on
the basis of faith.2 57  So, mere differentiation between religion and
nonreligion cannot be sufficient to raise a presumption of constitu-
254 Laycock, supra note 14, at 180-81.
255 Davey, 540 U.S. at 721. Laycock agrees, albeit in protest, that this is so under
current law: "Rust and Davey mean that if you take money from the government, the
government acquires full power to prohibit any other activity, including the exercise of
constitutional rights, performed by subsidized staff or conducted on the property
where the government money is spent." Laycock, supra note 14, at 197.
2 5 Anderson v. Town of Durham, 895 A.2d 944, 959 (Me. 2006) (quoting Eulitt ex
rel Eulitt v. Me. Dep't of Educ., 386 F.3d 344, 355 (1st Cir. 2004)).
257 See supra text accompanying note 4.
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tional difficulty, despite what is sometimes said to the contrary.258
Some egregious forms of categorization, however, may be suspect.
Recently, the Supreme Court has suggested that it will protect against
antireligious animus to some degree. 259  The Davey Court distin-
guished a Washington program from more nefarious differentia-
260
tion. Washington had simply been following a state constitutional
provision that afforded greater antiestablishment protection than the
federal Constitution. 26' The Court implied that Washington could not
have acted with animus toward devotional theology without raising
some sort of constitutional concern. At the very least, it left itself
262room to adopt an anti-animus rule in a future case.
Yet a rule against governmental animus may raise problems of
constitutional theory. First, while there is a long tradition of constitu-
tional concern about state action against particular sects, there is not
the same level of concern about differentiation on the basis of relig-
263ion as a whole. Part of the point of this Article is precisely that the
government may act with regard to religion generally in ways that
would be much more difficult when directed toward individual sects
258 Cf Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993) ("[T]he minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on
its face.").
259 The Court uses the terms "animus" and "hostility" interchangeably. This Arti-
cle limits itself to the word "animus."
260 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 724 (2004) ("Far from evincing the hostility
toward religion which was manifest in Lukumi, we believe that the entirety of the Prom-
ise Scholarship Program goes a long way toward including religion in its benefits."); id.
at 725 ("[W]e find neither in the history or text of... the Washington Constitution,
nor in the operation of the Promise Scholarship Program, anything that suggests ani-
mus toward religion.").
261 See id. at 722 ("Even though the differently worded Washington Constitution
draws a more stringent line than that drawn by the United States Constitution, the in-
terest it seeks to further is scarcely novel. In fact, we can think of few areas in which a
State's antiestablishment interests come more into play.").
262 In a footnote, the Court said explicitly that it has "sometimes characterized the
Establishment Clause as prohibiting the State from disapproving of a particular relig-
ion or of religion in general." Id. at 725 n.10 (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted).
At least one prominent commentator has subsequently suggested that animus
against religious people or practices is now not only sufficient to show a free exercise
violation, as this Article suggests, but also necessary-and not only with respect to
funding, but in other contexts as well. See Hamilton, supra note 66, at 1101 (arguing
that the Court usually "requir[es] obedience to legislative determinations of the public
good, unless there is evidence of animus or hostility towards religion").
263 The Davey Court suggested that Lukumi involved an instance of animus, but in
that case the government singled out a particular sect, not religion as a whole, for bur-
densome regulation. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 724-25.
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or denominations. Second, prohibiting animus, as opposed to more
acceptable government motivations, could raise problems of evidence
and proof.26 Third, and related, such a rule could involve courts in
the difficult task of drawing principled lines between permissible and
impermissible government judgments of value or morality.2 6 5 As a
theoretical matter, then, it is unclear whether a rule against animus
can be conceptualized in a satisfying way.
Nevertheless, this Article does insist on some such limit to the gov-
ernment's ability to target religion, even in funding programs. It does
so by proposing a narrow approach designed to circumvent the deep-
est theoretical debates surrounding impermissible government moti-
vations.2 6 A basic constitutional principle prevents official action that
raises an unmistakable inference of distaste for religion, unconnected
to any legitimate justification for excising religious groups or entities
267from funding programs. Most exclusions of religion will be some-
howjustifiable based on, for instance, the antiestablishment values de-
scribed above: equal citizenship, division avoidance, taxpayer free-
dom, etc. Yet some may lack any possible ground in legitimate public
policy. While the American constitutional tradition worries more
about government action that differentiates on the basis of sect or de-
nomination, it seems also to guard against governmental disadvantag-
26 Scholars have suggested, for instance, that it will be difficult to show that a
funding denial is connected to a state's Blaine amendment, even if that state constitu-
tional provision was originally enacted out of anti-Catholic sentiment. Lawmakers can
easily paper over an impermissible motive by articulating an acceptable rationale for a
religious classification. And the Davey court itself refused to recognize any connection
between Washington's Blaine Amendment and the funding exclusion in the Promise
Scholarship program. See Laycock, supra note 14, at 187-88 (discussing Davey, 540 U.S.
at 723).
265 Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) ("Of course
it is our moral heritage that one should not hate any human being or class of human
beings. But I had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible-
murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to animals-and could exhibit even
'animus' toward such conduct.").
266 For instance, this Article avoids the civic republicanism that sometimes bolsters
anti-animus proposals in the religion context and elsewhere. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra
note 66, at 1101 ("[P]inciples of republicanism have informed the Supreme Court's Re-
ligion Clause jurisprudence . .." (footnote omitted)); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences
and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689, 1690-91 (1984) (describing the general an-
tipathy of republicanism toward laws that target politically unpopular groups).
11 Here I agree generally with McConnell, supra note 18, at 1046-47, though he
treats hostility toward religion as simply a type of government reason that cannot over-
come a presumption that a selective defunding of religion is unconstitutional.
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ing of religion as a whole in certain extreme circumstances. "s That
concern may be particularly acute today, when a prominent fault line
in American politics and society lies not between faiths, but instead
between those who would purge religion from our public life and
269
those who believe it deserves a fuller place there.
This Article offers a narrow definition: an animus-based exclusion
of religion is one that bars religious groups from exceptionally broad
government support programs or otherwise presents a stark mismatch
between the scope of the exclusion and the scope of state aid. Some
government programs are widely available and normally extended to
everyone in the same way. When the state excludes religious groups
from these sorts of programs, courts may step in. Other exclusions that
are obviously unconnected to the purpose of a benefit may also be disal-
lowed. Much depends on the details of the particular program.
This approach to animus is circumscribed. Notice that it depends
only on the relationship between the nature of the exclusion and the
nature of the benefit program, not on an attempt to directly discern
government motivation. In that way, it aspires to avoid much of the
difficulty that normally accompanies such rules-problems of evi-
dence, for instance. A law issued amid indications of actual animus
toward religion might still be upheld on the ground that a legitimate
justification could be given for the exclusion. This Article's definition
of animus therefore would allow government activity that some citi-
zens will find objectionable-preferring that such disputes be resolved
in the political process-but it also would provide a needed backstop
against particularly egregious exclusions of religion without involving
courts in excessive line-drawing.
Because this definition is drawn so narrowly, instances of activity
that would come under its purview are difficult to imagine. A para-
digmatic example would be a town ordinance that singled out houses
of worship for special denials of basic services, such as police and fire
protection, access to public water and electricity systems, or use of
268 Cf Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Equal Regard, in LAW &
RELIGION: A CRITIcAL ANTHOLOGY 200, 203-04 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000) (de-
scribing the belief that "one's status as a member of our political community ought not
to depend in any way upon one's religious beliefs").
Because of the distinctive place of religion in our constitutional tradition, this Ar-
ticle does not rely on the general rule against animus in equal protection law. See Ro-
met, 517 U.S. at 634-36; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
446-47 (1985). Principles of religious freedom provide more specific guidance, mak-
ing reference to general equal protection concepts unnecessary.
269 FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 6.
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town waste removal services. Excluding religion from general benefits
like these ought to be presumptively unconstitutional. Denying such
services to churches and synagogues would not further any acceptable
policy, such as promoting a particularly strong conception of anties-
tablishment.
Other instances of mismatch between an excision and the nature
of a program could be more contentious. Consider a state university
policy that refused to recognize not simply student groups that dis-
criminated on the basis of sexual orientation, but instead only reli-
gious groups that did so. Fashioning the antidiscrimination policy in
this way arguably would be too disconnected from the nature and
purpose of the program to serve any rightful end. If declining to sup-
port homophobia were the goal, then the policy would apply even-
handedly to all student groups. And if promoting antiestablishment
were the objective, then the policy would simply decline to fund aH re-
ligious groups. Instead of either of these, such a program arguably
would exhibit what this Article defines as animus.
In sum, the rule against antireligious animus comes into play
where there is a glaring mismatch between the nature of the exclusion
and the nature of the program. That limit is essential to any sensible
approach to excluding religion.
D. Viewpoint Discrimination
The remaining two limits are specific to the speech context. This
Section acknowledges the rule that programs supporting a diversity of
private speech presumptively may not discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint.27 ° That rule may be difficult to defend on theoretical
grounds, as noted above, but it is settled as a practical matter.
Again, the rule against viewpoint discrimination does not apply in
the same way to government speech.27' When the government itself
communicates, it may choose to endorse certain political positions
272over others. That is intuitive. After all, politicians take positions on
matters of public policy all the time-that is central to theirjob-and
273
they craft government programs to further those policies. Congress
270 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001); Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46, 48-49 (1983).
271 This qualification was noted above in Part I.A.
272 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995).
275 AsJustice Scalia has noted,
It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view on
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may endorse childbirth over abortion, for instance, and may promote
the view that citizens ought to avoid terminating their pregnancies. It
may even fund programs to encourage health care professionals to
274
communicate that official position. And to the degree that a town's
policy constitutes government speech, it may display only secular
holiday symbols on the steps of town hall. That rule is relevant to this
Article's topic to the degree that government speech can be consid-
275
ered a form of subsidy of religious expression.
Matters are different when officials do not speak themselves but
instead seek to foster a wide range of private expression. Here the
presumption against viewpoint discrimination applies-even though
the government is not regulating private speech, but merely subsidiz-
ing it.276 And the Court has held, mistakenly in this Article's view but
enduringly, that a religious perspective often constitutes a viewpoint
that cannot be excluded from a program that supports a diversity of
private expression without offending the antidiscrimination rule. 77
A difficulty with this limit is that it seems to have been challenged
in Davey. There the Court approved an exclusion of theology majors
from a Washington scholarship program that supported a variety of
academic speech. Chief Justice Rehnquist attempted to distinguish
(in modern times, at least) innumerable subjects .... And it makes not a bit
of difference, insofar as either common sense or the Constitution is con-
cerned, whether these officials further their (and, in a democracy, our) fa-
vored point of view by achieving it directly (having government-employed art-
ists paint pictures, for example, or government-employed doctors perform
abortions); or by advocating it officially... ; or by giving money to others who
achieve or advocate it .... None of this has anything to do with abridging
anyone's speech.
Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment). Justice Scalia goes on to concede that the government cannot skew
viewpoints in a limited public forum. Id. at 598-99. But he is right to say that, under
current law, government retains a great deal of ability to promote the views it favors.
274 Id. at 598.
275 See supra Part II.A.
276 Rationales for the ban on viewpoint discrimination in funding are not clear to
everyone. See, e.g., Finley, 524 U.S. at 597-98 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(questioning the rationale for prohibiting viewpoint discrimination in funding). If the
government may subsidize one constitutionally protected activity without funding an
alternate and equally protected course of action, why must it fund expression equally? A
deeper theory of the difference between freedom of speech and other liberty-based
rights is necessary to account for this difference. This Article simply takes this long-
standing distinction as a given.
277 See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46.
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Rosenberger in a cursory footnote 278 that has failed to satisfy commenta-
tors.2 79 At best, the footnote could be understood to have distin-
guished between true public fora, such as the University of Virginia
program in Rosenberger, and more limited subsidies of private speech,
such as the one Washington created in Davey. But that distinction
should not have mattered. As noted above, viewpoint discrimination
is prohibited whenever a range of private speech is funded, even if no
forum is created.28°
The government may retain some leeway to exclude religious ex-
pression, however. Part II.C argued that worship itself need not be
viewed as providing a viewpoint that must be included whenever the
state sets out to support a variety of community speech, though the
question is close.
E. Restricting a Traditional Public Forum
The government may not single out religious speakers or mes-
sages for exclusion from a traditional public forum. This rule follows
from the more general doctrine that content-based exclusions are
presumptively unconstitutional in quintessential public fora such as
sidewalks and parks. 81 Its underlying theoretical justification sounds
in liberty: where government benefits form part of the baseline of
public goods that facilitate speech and the exercise of other rights,
exclusion from those benefits may work to restrict protected activity.
Note that it is not necessary for the purposes of this limit to agree with
the Rosenberger Court that targeted exclusions of religion should be
278 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 n.3 (2004).
279 Laycock, supra note 14, at 191.
280 See supra note 154 and accompanying text. A clear distinction persists, in this
otherwise muddy area, between government speech and government facilitation of a
range of private expression. Regardless of whether Washington's program created a
forum in Davey, it certainly encouraged a diversity of private communications, and that
presumptively precluded it from discriminating on the basis of viewpoint, even in
funding. See Laycock, supra note 14, at 192 ("[F]orum analysis [in Davey] was a distrac-
tion, because Davey showed viewpoint discrimination."); id. at 194 ("The scholarships
in Davey were available to all within a very broad category.. ").
281 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
("For the state to enforce a content-based exclusion [from a quintessential public fo-
rum,] it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."). This presumptive ban on content
discrimination applies regardless of whether the public forum is traditional or desig-
nated. Id. at 45-46; see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753 (1995) (closely scrutinizing an exclusion of religious speech from a traditional
public forum without characterizing the exclusion as viewpoint discrimination).
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considered instances of viewpoint rather than content discrimination.
That distinction matters a great deal in limited public fora, where the
state may decide to support certain forms of speech but not others-
even on the basis of content-but where it still may not make such de-.• 282
cisions on the basis of viewpoint. When it comes to traditional pub-
lic fora, however, exclusions of religion from state support are pre-
sumptively unconstitutional, regardless of whether they are regarded
as discriminating on the basis of content or viewpoint.
Last year, the Tenth Circuit ruled that a Utah city could not con-
stitutionally refuse to allow Summum, a religious group, to display its
symbols in a city park alongside other permanent displays erected by
281private groups. Summum petitioned the city to erect a monument
communicating the Seven Aphorisms of Summum in the city park,
which already contained a Ten Commandments monument donated
by the Fraternal Order of Eagles.1 4 The city denied Summum's re-
quest on the ground that the proposed display did not meet the city's
criteria, which included a requirement that displays relate directly to
the history of the city or "be donated by groups with long-standing ties
to the [city] community."28 5 A panel held that the city's denial was a
content-based exclusion from a traditional public forum that was pre-
sumptively unconstitutional.2 6  Of course the city did not explicitly
target religious expression as a whole for denial of access to the park,
and in that sense the case did not involve an exclusion of religion.
And Judge McConnell, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc, argued powerfully that the existing displays constituted govern-
ment speech, from which the city could excluded Summum. 27 Yet
282 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
("Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and
speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the pur-
pose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral."); Pery, 460 U.S. at 46 ("[T]he
State may reserve [a nonpublic] forum for its intended purposes, communicative or
otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to sup-
press expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.").
283 Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1052-55 (10th Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2008) (No. 07-665).
284 Id. at 1047; see also id. at 1047 n.2 (characterizing the Ten Commandments
monument as private speech).
285 Id. (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
286 See id. at 1050 ("Because the park is a public forum, the city's restrictions on
speech are subject to strict scrutiny."); id. at 1055 (finding that the restriction would
likely be held unconstitutional).
28' Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1175-76 (10th Cir. 2007)
(McConnell, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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the point remains that if the city had in fact excluded only religious
messages from a traditional public forum, while allowing other private
communications, it would have had to justify that restriction with a
particularly powerful rationale. The rule restricting such discrimina-
tion in traditional public places applies rarely, but it nevertheless im-
poses an important limit on the ability of public officials to deny state
support to religious speakers.
CONCLUSION
Can the government influence citizens' choices among competing
commitments of conscience? This Article's argument has implications
for that question. After all, welfare-state programs that excise reli-
gious observance will sometimes have the foreseeable effect of dis-
couraging sacred activities or encouraging comparable secular ones.
Whether those sorts of effects are appropriate in our constitutional
system is a matter of significant debate. Does a constitutional democ-
racy lack any power to sway private choices concerning conscience?2
8
If not, what boundaries limit its ability to do so? This Article has de-
veloped a framework that may aid our analysis of such matters. 2"9 One
implication of its argument is that policymakers have some power,
however limited, to encourage protected activity that they consider
socially beneficial. Just as they may encourage childbirth rather than
abortion, or nonprofit activity that does not include lobbying, policy-
makers may in some analogous way encourage community activities
that they think will unite citizens around common secular ends or
otherwise foster social harmony. Such decisions can be left to the
democratic process more often than is sometimes suggested. One in-
fluential theory holds that constitutional courts should require the
government to remain as neutral as it possibly can be when it comes to
matters of conscience. 290 This Article takes a somewhat different view.
288 See McConnell, supra note 18, at 1035 (noting that Roe v. Wade seemed to rest
on the view that the government lacked authority to favor claims of conscience, while
Meyer v. Nebraska relied on the view that the government could favor certain value judg-
ments over others but was limited in its ability to use coercive means to enforce them).
289 For a thoughtful discussion of related questions, see Richard W. Garnett, As-
similation, Toleration, and the State's Interest in the Development of Religious Doctrine, 51
UCLAL. REv. 1645, 1693-1700 (2004).
290 See Laycock, supra note 14, at 159-61 (arguing that the neutrality principle fa-
vors theology scholarships but opposes the use of "under God" in the Pledge of Alle-
giance); McConnell, supra note 18, at 1003-05 (applying that theory to the examples of
abortion and religious education); see also id. at 994 ("The theory underlying both Roe
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From the discussion above, two points seem uncontroverted.
First, when the government speaks, it can take positions on matters of
political ideology. In fact, it does so all the time. Elected officials
regularly craft official messages that favor, say, environmentalism over
development, or marriage over cohabitation. As a matter of con-
stitutional law, government speech may discriminate even on the basis
of viewpoint. 
291
Does that rule extend to religious expression by the government?
Not in any straightforward way, surely. There is some possibility that
the government may endorse religion over irreligion in its communi-
292cations, for instance through legislative prayer. We will know more
when the Court addresses the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Al-
legiance, as it likely will before long. 9 3 While the Justices have often
remarked in passing that the government may not favor religion over
irreligion (or vice versa),4 certain members of the Court think that it• 299
may express a preference for belief over unbelief. To the degree
that is true, it is possible for the government to discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint even when it speaks about religion.29'
Yet there must be a special limit on the ability of official expres-
sion to favor a sect or denomination. It would presumably not be
permissible for Congress to adopt a resolution declaring that "Amer-
ica Is Not a Muslim Nation." That message would constitute preferen-
tialism, which presumably is impermissible even in a resolution.297
The Court has said, speaking in the context of a case concerning state
and the free exercise clause is that the best solution to the dissension [in value-laden
matters] is to 'privatize' the decision ....").
291 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (cit-
ing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)).
292 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (holding that legislative
prayer was not an establishment of religion but "simply a tolerable acknowledgement
of beliefs widely held among the people of this country").
293 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2004) (dismiss-
ing a challenge to the Pledge without reaching the merits).
294 See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 875 (2005) ("[T]he
principle of neutrality has provided a good sense of direction: the government may
not favor... religion over irreligion ....").
295 See id. at 889 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[H]ow can the Court possibly assert that
the First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and nonre-
ligion, and that manifesting a purpose to favor adherence to religion generally is un-
constitutional?" (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted)).
Recall that the Court has held that religious expression may constitute a dis-
tinct viewpoint. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
27 See supra Part III.A•
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expression, that the government "may not favor one religion over an-
other."29 8 Now some Justices have suggested that state expression
sometimes may discriminate even among sects.2 99 According to them,
officials may endorse monotheism over minority conceptions, includ-
ing polytheism (e.g., Hinduism), nontheism (e.g., some versions of
Buddhism), and atheism.3 0 0 Honoring a monotheistic god is histori-
cally grounded and commonly accepted by Americans and therefore
cannot be understood as government endorsement of a particular re-
301ligious view. Under that view, any limit on the ability of government
speech to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in its religious expres-
sion would be narrow. The more defensible approach, and the one
more likely to prevail in the Court, is that the government may not
engage in preferentialism, even in its own expression. And whatever
the outcome of that dispute, it will remain true that the state may limit
itself to secular messages, even when it knows that doing so will have
the effect of encouraging secular discourse in the public sphere.
298 McCreay, 545 U.S. at 875; see also id. at 884 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[The
Framers] may not have foreseen the variety of religions for which this Nation would
eventually provide a home.... But they did know that line-drawing between religions
is an enterprise that, once begun, has no logical stopping point.").
299 AsJustice Scalia noted in his McCreary dissent,
[T]oday's opinion suggests that.., government cannot favor one religion
over another. That is indeed a valid principle where public aid or assistance
to religion is concerned, or where the free exercise of religion is at issue, but
it necessarily applies in a more limited sense to public acknowledgment of the
Creator. If religion in the public forum had to be entirely nondenomina-
tional, there could be no religion in the public forum at all.... With respect
to public acknowledgment of religious belief, it is entirely clear from our Na-
tion's historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard
of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the dis-
regard of devout atheists.
Id. at 893 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
According to this reasoning, which relies heavily on practices at the time of the
founding, it might also be possible to exclude non-Christian monotheisms-such as
Judaism and Islam-from government speech. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,
728-29 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Justice Scalia's reasoning would
allow the government to exclude Judaism and Islam from its messages).
301 Justice Scalia espoused this view in McCreary:
Publicly honoring the Ten Commandments is thus indistinguishable, insofar
as discriminating against other religions is concerned, from publicly honoring
God. Both practices are recognized across such a broad and diverse range of
the population-from Christians to Muslims-that they cannot be reasonably
understood as a government endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint.
545 U.S. at 894 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
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A second point of agreement is that the exercise of constitutional
rights presumptively may not be coerced through state regulation. So,
for example, lawmakers may not place an "undue burden" on a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability, even
though they may express disapproval of abortions. 3 And legislators
may not require students to salute the flag, even though they may
urge citizens to endorse the salute and the patriotic values it ex-303
presses. Similarly, in the area of free exercise, officials may not
normally burden observance by targeting a religious practice for spe-S• 304
cial civil or criminal penalties. Even religious practice as a whole
may not be restricted without some strong justification. 30 5  In other
words, government regulation, as compared to government expres-
sion, faces far greater restrictions on the government's ability to influ-
ence the constitutionally protected choices of citizens.
Excising protected activity from government support presents a
third case. Again, a prominent theory holds that aid schemes may not
sway private choices concerning matters of conscience. 3 6 Creating
economic incentives in one direction or another may wrongly com-
promise state neutrality toward decisions that should remain private.
That would be true whenever the state influences a citizen's protected
choice between two alternatives-say, secular and religious school-
ing-even when the citizen remains relatively free to engage in the
protected activity. Of course, this view is particularly powerful in the
context of the modern welfare state, where government funding pro-
grams may be so pervasive and significant that they are thought to al-
ter the baseline of what citizens can legitimately expect, so that exclu-
sions of protected activity from basic programs become
constitutionally troublesome. Yet proponents of this theory apply its
302 Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1626-27 (2007).
303 SeeW. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see also McCon-
nell, supra note 18, at 1036 ("Barnette did not mean.., that the state was prohibited
from encouraging the flag salute and the values it represents.").
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547
(1993) (striking down a law prohibiting animal sacrifice).
3 See id. at 532 ("At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause per-
tain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or
prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons." (emphasis added)).
See McConnell, supra note 18, at 1004 ("Paying for secular schools without pay-
ing for religious schools creates a clear incentive to forgo religious education."); id. at
994 (drawing a parallel between individual religious autonomy and the rights to choice
recognized in Roe and Pierce); see also Laycock, supra note 14, at 160 ("[G]overnment
should minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious be-
lief .. " (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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lessons more generally. Evenhandedness, for them, should remain a
constitutional commitment even where selectivity affects programs
that are not available as broadly, such as state support for halfway
houses or local private schools. They argue that funding schemes
should leave protected choices as unaffected by public policy as they
possibly can be.
This Article, by contrast, takes the view that certain rights-
including religious liberty-are best understood as primarily protect-
ing the ability of individuals to engage in valued activity, not in ensur-
ing official evenhandedness for its own sake. Government support
programs that fund the choice of one such protected practice rather
than another have not been presumed to restrict citizens' ability to
engage in the unfunded practice, even though those programs may
well influence private choices. Many such programs are therefore
more analogous to nonneutral government speech than they are to
regulation. (Programs that support an array of private speech, but not
religious expression, may present an exception.) That view allows the
government greater leeway to take actions that will have a predictable
influence on private decision making concerning religion than the
evenhandedness approach does. It also gives constitutional courts a
reduced role, allowing political actors greater discretion to knowingly
influence citizen commitments.
This Article may also suggest a somewhat different view of consti-
tutional democracy from that of the no-influence theory. A democ-
racy need not remain completely neutral among commitments of con-
science. In fact, it may make judgments and set policies that affect
them, so long as it does not violate certain limits. Several of those lim-
its blend this Article's primary concern regarding liberty or autonomy
together with freestanding commitments to evenhandedness, neutral-
ity, or equality. Rules against sectarian preferentialism, animus, and
viewpoint discrimination, for instance, impose independent require-
ments of neutrality or equality. This Article thus offers a nuanced
framework for determining when and how public officials may use se-
lective support to influence citizens' choices concerning matters of
conscience. That framework may also offer some help in answering
the even broader question of when and how it is appropriate for a
constitutional democracy to sway citizen choices that are protected by
other rights, such as freedom of expression and the right to privacy.
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